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Problems and Recommendations 
Organized Crime and Development 
Challenges and Policy Options in West Africa’s 
Fragile States 
The development implications of transnational organ-
ized crime (TOC) have attracted growing attention in 
Germany and at the international level in recent years. 
Fragile and conflict-affected countries are a particular 
focus of interest. In the development policy debate, it 
has long been recognized that TOC and criminal vio-
lence are among the reasons why most fragile states 
have not achieved the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). This is one reason why the development com-
munity has to engage with the issue of organized crime 
and the risks that it poses to fragile states. Organized 
crime is a cross-cutting issue, not merely a security 
problem. TOC is accompanied far more often by eco-
nomic damage, environmental degradation, health 
problems and corruption than by widespread violence 
and instability. What’s more, the conventional “law 
and order” approach on its own has proved largely 
unsuccessful in fragile states. Combating organized 
crime is primarily a task for civil law enforcement 
agencies, but they too are increasingly recognizing the 
need for new approaches and forms of cooperation. 
Entry points for synergies and a networked approach 
thus exist, especially since the development commu-
nity is already dealing with TOC or TOC-relevant fields 
more often than assumed – whether in bilateral pro-
grammes to promote alternative development in drug 
cultivation areas or when supporting the establish-
ment of sustainable fishing and forestry sectors in 
partner countries. 
More systematic engagement with TOC must be 
based, however, on a precise analysis of the threats 
with which it is associated and the trade-offs that can 
arise in contexts of fragile statehood, for TOC can 
bypass or operate in tandem with, against and/or in 
place of the state. Not only do the drivers of criminal 
activity and the networks involved vary in each con-
text. TOC itself may adopt various modi operandi in 
conditions of fragile statehood, acting as an external 
stressor, an economy of violence, a form of state cap-
ture, or a world of existence/survival. On this basis, 
four threat categories can be identified. They often 
overlap and all four are usually relevant in one and 
the same context, albeit to varying extents. However, 
they each require different approaches and measures, 
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ranging from classic deterrence to economic trans-
formation and cultural change around TOC. These 
measures do not necessarily interact; indeed, they may 
conflict, so manifestations of TOC in any given coun-
try should be analyzed with reference to these four 
threat categories in order, at least, to anticipate pos-
sible trade-offs.  
The analysis of illicit economies in Liberia, Sierra 
Leone and Guinea shows that the threats posed by 
TOC change over time and that their impacts vary 
across localities and sectors within and between coun-
tries. Cocaine trafficking and illegal fishing in par-
ticular are powerful external stressors with clearly 
negative consequences for societies, but have, so far, 
rarely been associated with direct violence. However, 
links between the transit of cocaine and actors in the 
region are further advanced, and the potential for 
violence in the drug trade is higher overall, than in 
illegal fishing, especially in Guinea. If intensifying 
law enforcement is the only action taken against un-
authorized industrial fishing, there is a risk that the 
state and politicians will be “captured” to a greater 
extent by criminal interests and networks capable of 
purchasing higher-level protection. So in this sector, 
combining various measures in a networked approach 
can be a sensible solution. This can take place through 
cross-sectoral and interdepartmental programmes 
along the entire illicit trade chain. In the case of the 
three West African countries mentioned above, better 
surveillance of coastal areas should be combined, at 
the very least, with reforms to make the onshore regu-
lation and governance of the fisheries sector more ef-
fective and transparent. In view of the effort required 
for deterrence in the maritime sector, it may also be 
appropriate to involve local artisanal fishermen in the 
monitoring of coastal waters. The development com-
munity can make an important contribution here and 
can also help to improve the management of the sec-
tor. Integrating development policy approaches with 
those from other policy fields, which may be sensible 
in this context, is not necessarily the appropriate 
response in other situations, however. In relation to 
cocaine trafficking, for example, a complementary 
engagement, e.g. in security sector and/or judicial 
reform, should be considered. In Guinea, given its 
political situation, it is questionable whether building 
deterrence capacities is useful at all. If any measure is 
to be adopted, then improving general transparency 
in the political process should be considered. In all 
three countries, implementing specific recommenda-
tions made by the West Africa Commission on Drugs, 
especially those pertaining to prevention and harm 
reduction, may be an important starting point. There 
also is some scope for contributions from develop-
ment cooperation to curb illegal logging. In relation 
to the illicit gold and diamond trade, the development 
community should focus primarily on alternative 
development and violence prevention in mining areas 
and also work towards the further harmonization of 
legislation and certification in the countries con-
cerned while targeted efforts should be made to curb 
organized fraud and scams involving counterfeit 
minerals. 
There are no universal solutions to the trade-offs 
identified in the context of TOC in Liberia, Sierra 
Leone and Guinea. Nonetheless, some broad conclu-
sions can be drawn about the options for development 
cooperation. In order to design development pro-
grammes which are sensitive to TOC, new or modified 
analytical tools are required. Rather than viewing 
TOC purely in terms of criminal violence, these tools 
should treat it as a part of the political economy 
which permeates almost all areas of life. With such 
diverse threats, it is impossible to avoid programmes 
having side effects on the TOC complex, but these 
effects should be anticipated as far as possible and 
factored into decision-making. With regard to develop-
ment programmes containing organized crime or 
mitigating its impacts, it is essential – in addition to 
targeted interdepartmental and cross-sectoral ap-
proaches in some fields – to systematically evaluate 
experiences and better link different pillars in devel-
opment cooperation itself. Furthermore, the regional 
and global levels are highly relevant for action, 
especially in relation to the (illicit) trade in natural 
resources. German development policy can play an 
active role in international forums when it comes to 
the TOC/development nexus, for example in the im-
plementation of the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs), for although fragile states are especially at 
risk, criminal networks are increasingly globalized, 
and their operations strongly driven by demand in 
other world regions. 
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The risk of organized crime. 
From the security to the development agenda 
 
Organized crime (OC)1 is a multidimensional phenom-
enon, and the risk spectrum associated with it is simi-
larly broad. The impacts of OC range from economic 
damage to threats to domestic and even international 
security. The OC-terrorism nexus in fragile states has 
often been a cause of particular international concern. 
Actors engaged in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, 
too, have increasingly had to grapple with illicit eco-
nomies, TOC and the associated business interests.2 In 
particular United Nations (UN) peace operations are 
almost always confronted with the remnants of war 
economies and new manifestations of crime during 
 
1  Organized crime (OC) is typically characterized by the 
following attributes: continuity, structure and the use of 
criminal resources in order to obtain a financial or other 
material benefit (Joseph Wheatley, “Transnational Organized 
Crime: A Survey of Laws, Policies and International Conven-
tions”, in Routledge Handbook of Transnational Organized Crime, 
ed. Felia Allum and Stan Gilmour [Abingdon/New York, 2012], 
65–79 [67]). The United Nations Convention against Trans-
national Organized Crime (Palermo Convention), which was 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2000, 
defines organized criminal groups as “structured group[s] 
of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and 
acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more 
serious crimes or offences established in accordance with 
this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a 
financial or other material benefit”, see Article 2 (a), United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 
in United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
and the Protocols thereto (New York: United Nations, 2004). The 
use of this definition is sometimes problematical, as the term 
“serious crime” is defined in the Convention as meaning 
“conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum 
deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious 
penalty” (Article 2(b)); however, the legal situation in some 
signatory states – particularly fragile states – does not always 
accord with this definition, even for conduct which the inter-
national community clearly classes as organized crime. The 
more general definition is therefore used for the purpose of 
this study which generally focuses on TOC, meaning all forms 
of organized crime with a transnational dimension.  
2  See, for example, Profiting from Peace. Managing the Resource 
Dimensions of Civil War, ed. Karen Ballentine and Heiko 
Nitzschke (Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner, 2005). 
periods of transition.3 TOC has been recognized more 
recently as a challenge for development and, indeed, 
for actors engaged in development cooperation. Part 
of the reason for this growing attention is that secu-
rity policy approaches to combating TOC in conflict 
countries and regions have rarely achieved the desired 
results, but also that bilateral and multilateral devel-
opment cooperation is increasingly focusing on fragile 
and conflict-affected states. This group of countries is 
commonly regarded as highly vulnerable to TOC and 
its impacts, even though the driving forces behind 
organized crime tend to operate on a global scale and 
these states usually play a minor role in the value 
chains associated with transnational illegal markets.  
As early as 2003, the European Security Strategy 
identified organized crime as a key threat, emphasiz-
ing its link to weak or failed states.4 It is no coinci-
dence that the ESS makes specific mention of poppy 
grown in Afghanistan, the largest source of heroin 
consumed in Europe by far and an important source 
of income for the armed groups operating in that 
country. Not viewed as a priority at the start of the 
international intervention, efforts to fight the drug 
trade were reinforced from around 2004 onwards, 
particularly by the US and the UK.5 However, policies 
 
3  On this aspect, see also Judith Vorrath, From War to Illicit 
Economies. Organized Crime and State-building in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, SWP Research Paper 13/2014 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen-
schaft und Politik, November 2014). 
4  European Union, European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe 
in a Better World (Brussels, 2003), 4f. The conventional terms 
“fragile states” and “state fragility” are used in this paper and 
denote deficiencies in the provision of public goods, in the 
assertion of the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force, or simply in the provision of security and/or in the ac-
ceptance of rules on the exercise of power and the distribu-
tion of wealth (see Charles T. Call, “Beyond the ‘Failed State’. 
Toward Conceptual Alternatives”, European Journal of Internatio-
nal Relations 17, no. 2 [2011], 303–26 [306ff.]). The threshold for 
classifying a state as fragile due to such deficiencies is a high-
ly contentious issue. In this study, the OECD’s list of fragile 
states and economies for 2015 is used, see Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), States of 
Fragility 2015. Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions (Paris, 2015), 32f. 
5  Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Peacekeepers among Poppies: Af-
ghanistan, Illicit Economies and Intervention”, International 
Peacekeeping 16, no. 1 (2009), 100–14 (106). 
The risk of organized crime. From the security to the development agenda 
SWP Berlin 






based primarily on opium poppy eradication proved 
to be largely counterproductive.6 They revealed the 
international community’s incapability in responding 
to illicit economies in fragile states, as well as its over-
ly narrow focus on the financing of violent conflict 
from opium poppy cultivation.7 The repressive ap-
proach adopted in the “war on drugs” in Latin America 
is also increasingly questioned or even rejected. Many 
production and transit zones are now seeking new 
responses to the drug problem.8 
From a development policy perspective, however, 
TOC in fragile states has become an increasing focus 
of interest for another reason, namely that most 
fragile and conflict-affected states failed to reach the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and still tend 
to have the highest poverty rates.9 There are many 
reasons for this, but TOC and criminal violence are 
increasingly identified as main factors. As early as 
2005, the resolution on the World Summit outcome 
drew attention to the negative effects of transnational 
crime on development, peace and security and human 
rights.10 Since then, repeated cycles of armed conflict 
and criminal violence have frequently been identified 
as obstacles to development.11 As a consequence, the 
influence of TOC on conflict and fragility in general 
has moved into sharper focus.12 The “conflict trap” has 
extended to a “crime trap”, a term which encompasses 
 
6  Ibid., 110. 
7  Daniel Brombacher, “Nicht nur ein Problem innerer Sicher-
heit. Konsequenzen der organisierten Kriminalität für das 
internationale System”, Internationale Politik 65, no. 6 (Novem-
ber/December 2010), 20–25 (21). 
8  Two notable regional examples are: Organization of Ameri-
can States (OAS)/General Secretariat, The Drug Problem in the 
Americas (Washington, D.C., 2013); West Africa Commission 
on Drugs (WACD), Not Just in Transit. Drugs, the State and Society 
in West Africa (June 2014). 
9  See United Nations, The Millennium Development Goals Report 
2015 (New York: United Nations, 2015), 8. There will thus be 
a growing concentration of poverty and weak human devel-
opment in countries affected by fragility, see OECD, States of 
Fragility 2015 (see note 4), 18. 
10  United Nations General Assembly, Resolution Adopted by the 
General Assembly, Sixtieth Session, 60/1. 2005 World Summit Outcome, 
Agenda items 46 and 120 (24 October 2005), Article 111 (p. 26). 
11  World Bank, World Development Report 2011. Conflict, Security, 
and Development (Washington, D.C., 2011), 1 and 5; United 
Nations General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General, 
Keeping the Promise: A Forward-looking Review to Promote an Agreed 
Action Agenda to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals by 2015, 
A/64/665 (12 February 2010). 
12  See, for example, OECD, Think Global, Act Global: Confronting 
Global Factors that Influence Conflict and Fragility (Paris, Septem-
ber 2012). 
the entire spectrum of potentially negative impacts of 
crime on development.13 The 2015 OECD report States 
of Fragility describes transnational organized crime 
as a “global public ‘bad’” which has a particularly 
adverse effect on fragile states but is not adequately 
reflected in aggregate country lists.14 Accordingly, the 
UN’s Open Working Group enshrined the reduction 
of illicit financial and arms flows and combating all 
forms of organized crime in a separate target of the 
global Sustainable Development Goals adopted as part 
of the 2030 Agenda at the UN Summit in New York 
in September 2015.15 Beyond the multilateral level, 
various papers commissioned or published by bilateral 
donors have also identified possible development 
responses to TOC or TOC-dominated illegal trade such 
as in the drug economy.16 
This gradual accession of TOC onto the develop-
ment agenda is controversial, however. Above all, 
there is a fear that it will open the door for a further 
“securitization” of development policy. The current 
discussion surrounding the TOC-development nexus 
is, indeed, often equated with the debate about civil-
military cooperation in conflict situations, which has 
been ongoing for more than a decade. A pragmatic 
counter-argument is that the development commu-
nity should respond to TOC and the associated chal-
lenges because otherwise, security actors will simply 
adopt its strategies and instruments according to their 
 
13  James Cockayne, “Breaking the Crime Trap: Factoring 
Crime into Development Policy”, IPI Global Observatory (online), 
13 February 2014, http://theglobalobservatory.org/2014/02/ 
breaking-the-crime-trap-factoring-crime-into-development-
policy/ (accessed 2 September 2015). 
14  OECD, States of Fragility 2015 (see note 4), 69ff. 
15  Target 16.4 states: “By 2030, significantly reduce illicit 
financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return 
of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime”; 
United Nations, Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, A/RES/70/1, https://sustainabledevelop 
ment.un.org/content/documents/21252030%20Agenda%20 
for%20Sustainable%20Development%20web.pdf (accessed 
20 December 2015). 
16  See, for example: United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), The Development Response to Drug Traffick-
ing in Africa: A Programming Guide (Washington, D.C., April 
2013); Getting Smart and Scaling Up: Responding to the Impact of 
Organized Crime on Governance in Developing Countries, ed. Camino 
Kavanagh (New York: New York University, Center on Inter-
national Cooperation, June 2013); Bundesministerium für 
wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) and 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
(GIZ), Development Cooperation and Illegal Economies (Eschborn, 
February 2012). 
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own logic.17 But there are other more relevant reasons 
to engage with this issue and consider the options for 
action from a development perspective. 
Firstly, organized crime is a cross-cutting issue. Al-
though it is usually accompanied by the threat and/or 
use of coercion and violence is a common corollary, 
its main motive is profit. TOC operates, by and large, 
according to the logic of illicit markets. Violence is 
the outcome of cost-benefit considerations or is used 
to keep “order”, rather than being driven by any ideo-
logical or political rationale. Although the motives 
and objectives of the actors involved are not always 
clearly distinguishable, TOC differs from other trans-
national threats, such as terrorism, with which it is 
often – wrongly – lumped together. Violence and 
insecurity can occur, but the threats posed by TOC 
are far more diverse. For example, the threats to the 
achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) are not limited solely to Target 16.4, mentioned 
above. In fact, organized criminal activities may well 
have direct or indirect negative implications for a 
number of SDGs across various sectors and may in 
some cases inhibit real progress, especially on health, 
the environment and governance/justice.18 This ap-
plies particularly to fragile states, where “organised 
crime may thrive on fragility, further erode statehood, 
and thus have a further negative impact on already 
low levels of governance and weak state capacity”.19 
For development cooperation, then, TOC is of cross-
sectoral relevance and at the same time there is a 
particularly urgent need for action in fragile states. 
Secondly, combating TOC as part of the security 
agenda is mainly about law enforcement. Although 
the military or units of the armed forces are deployed 
against TOC in some cases – notably in the war on 
drugs in Latin America and in tackling crime at sea – 
combating TOC is, in essence, a civilian matter, to be 
tackled by the police and justice system; so as a matter 
of principle, this is not about development policy 
objectives being subordinated under a military agenda. 
 
17  Sasha Jesperson, “Development Engagement with Organ-
ised Crime: A Necessary Shift or Further Securitisation?”, 
Conflict, Security & Development 15, no. 1 (2015), 23–50 (41). 
18  The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized 
Crime (GI), Organized Crime: A Cross-Cutting Threat to Sustainable 
Development. Measuring and Monitoring Transnational Organized 
Crime within the Framework of Sustainable Development for the Post-
2015 Development Agenda: Goals, Targets and Indicators, A Research 
Report (Geneva, January 2015). 
19  BMZ, Development for Peace and Security – Development Policy in 
the Context of Conflict, Fragility and Violence, BMZ Strategy Paper 
4/2013e, 7. 
Although law enforcement agencies have other goals 
and strategies than development cooperation, there 
are certainly some overlaps, for example when it 
comes to promoting the rule of law or decentraliza-
tion. Furthermore, there is a growing recognition 
among law enforcement agencies around the world 
that as globalization gathers pace, the conventional 
responses are, for the most part, no longer capable of 
dealing effectively with TOC. In fragile and conflict-
affected states in particular, the dominant “law and 
order” approach to tackling organized crime has had 
very limited success, prompting calls for new and 
innovative responses to strengthen such countries’ 
resilience to TOC.20 Various forums for dialogue and 
sharing of experience among law enforcement agen-
cies, development experts and representatives of 
various policy areas already exist,21 creating at least 
some entry points for synergies and networking. 
Thirdly, the development community itself already 
has more experience in dealing with TOC than is com-
monly assumed. The term “organized crime” might 
not be mentioned explicitly in project outlines, but 
many programmes touch on aspects that have strong 
connections with this problem area. For example, 
some bilateral programmes promoting alternative 
development in drug cultivation areas or sustainable 
fishing or forestry sectors, tackle causes of TOC or 
contribute to reducing criminal activities in specific 
sectors. Other programmes may help to mitigate the 
negative effects of TOC; examples are anti-corruption 
measures and health projects providing treatment 
for drug users, such as those being implemented 
jointly by the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) and the World Health Organization 
 
20  Rachel Locke, Organized Crime, Conflict, and Fragility: A New 
Approach (New York: International Peace Institute [IPI], July 
2012), 1. 
21  One such dialogue process was initiated in 2011 by the 
International Peace Institute and led to the founding, in 
2012, of the Global Initiative against Transnational Orga-
nized Crime, which promotes the debate within the frame-
work of a Development Dialogue; see Peter Gastrow, “Catching 
Up With Transnational Organized Crime: Time for New Think-
ing”, IPI Global Observatory (online), 27 April 2012, http://theglo 
balobservatory.org/2012/04/catching-up-with-transnational-
organized-crime-time-for-new-thinking/, and Global Initiative 
against Transnational Organized Crime, The Development Dia-
logue (online), www.globalinitiative.net/programs/governance/ 
the-development-dialogue/ (both accessed 2 September 2015). 
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(WHO) in West Africa.22 In Germany, the Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) 
GmbH has set up a TOC Working Group in order to 
facilitate a more systematic dialogue on development 
engagement with TOC and share practical project-
based experiences.23 In other words, the development 
community not only has an interest in focusing more 
on the risks posed by TOC, but already has entry 
points to do so. 
In recent years, various case-, sector- and group-
specific analyses have added to our knowledge of the 
specific risks posed by TOC in fragile states. The pros 
and cons of various responses to TOC and its impacts 
have also been discussed.24 In order to substantiate 
the development policy options, the first step is to 
draw up a systematic list of the threats and challenges 
posed by TOC in the context of fragile statehood, for 
although the available tools are well-known, the diver-
sity of TOC and the various degrees and types of state 
fragility make it impossible to draw general conclu-
sions about these tools’ potential interaction and 
trade-offs. At the same time, it is neither realistic nor 
desirable for bilateral development cooperation to 
tackle the whole range of TOC and its effects. It is 
more important to set priorities, keeping in mind the 
possible undesired side effects of any measures taken, 
and to choose a more comprehensive approach if 
necessary. This study offers a format for this process, 
based on a structured presentation of the threats 
associated with TOC and possible countermeasures, 
which then is applied to three focus countries25 in 
West Africa: Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
 
22  For more details, see Camino Kavanagh, International and 
Regional Responses to Drug Trafficking in West Africa. A Preliminary 
Overview, WACD Background Paper no. 6 (Geneva: WACD, 
September 2013), 50. 
23  For an overview of challenges and experiences identified, 
see GIZ, Tackling Transnational Organised Crime: Challenges, 
Responses and Partners of International Development Cooperation 
(Bonn and Eschborn, April 2015). 
24  See, in particular, Tim Midgley, Ivan Briscoe and Daniel 
Bertoli, Identifying Approaches and Measuring Impacts of Pro-
grammes Focused on Transnational Organised Crime (London: UK 
Department for International Development et al., May 2014). 
25  Due to the transnational character of TOC but also to the 
use of four threat categories, rather than separate country 
studies, for the empirical analysis, this paper talks about 
“focus countries” instead of “case studies”. The empirical 
analysis is based to a large extent on interviews conducted in 
2013 and 2014 during one-month field research trips in each 
of the three countries. The interviews are anonymised and 
referenced with a country code, serial number and the date 
of interview.  
 
TOC as an external stressor 
SWP Berlin 






What threats for whom? 
Challenges posed by organized crime in fragile states 
 
Fragile states are seen as being particularly vulnerable 
to organized crime due to their weaknesses in ful-
filling core state functions. However, this statement 
says nothing about the specific threats that they are 
exposed to on an individual basis. Broadly speaking, 
TOC can operate undetected, bypassing the state, or 
it can operate against, in tandem with and/or in place 
of the state. Often, all four variants can arise in one 
and the same context, albeit to varying extents over 
time and for different illicit trade flows. For each 
variant, specific modi operandi and threats posed by 
TOC can be identified, which in turn require specific 
policy responses.26 From a normative perspective 
with regard to the three core functions of the state 
(authority, capacity and legitimacy27), TOC can materi-
alize as an external stressor, a violent economy and/or 
state capture, further worsening fragility. In addition, 
under conditions of weak governance, it can act as a 
substitute for the state.28 Even if these arrangements 
of “governance without government”29 deviate from 
the norm and are unstable in some respects, they are 
nonetheless an expression of a society’s ability to 
adapt, as well as being an important precondition for 
the survival of some groups within society.30 It there-
fore cannot be assumed that TOC automatically has a 
destabilizing effect; rather, its functions and embed-
dedness in the society concerned must be considered. 
In the debate about TOC in fragile states, the four 
threat categories are reflected in different but some-
times overlapping lines of argument. They correspond 
 
26  This has been stressed generally for dealing with fragility 
by Charles T. Call, Beyond the ‘Failed State’ (see note 4), 306. 
27  Based on these categories, typologies of state fragility have 
been developed; see Jörn Grävingholt, Sebastian Ziaja and 
Merle Kreibaum, State Fragility: Towards a Multi-Dimensional 
Empirical Typology, Discussion Paper 3/2012 (Bonn: Deutsches 
Institut für Entwicklungspolitik [DIE], 2012), 1. 
28  Daniel Lambach and Felix Bethke, Ursachen von Staatskollaps 
und fragiler Staatlichkeit: Eine Übersicht über den Forschungsstand, 
INEF-Report 106 (Duisburg: Institut für Entwicklung und 
Frieden [INEF], 2012), 10. 
29  For an overview of the related debate, see Tanja A. Börzel 
and Thomas Risse, “Governance without a State: Can It 
Work?”, Regulation & Governance 4, no. 2 (2010), 113–34. 
30  Tobias Debiel and Daniel Lambach, “State Fragility as a 
Development Policy Challenge”, Rural 21, no. 1 (2012), 9. 
with specific countermeasures, which range from 
classic deterrence to cultural change around TOC, 
target different levels of the TOC system and can be 
implemented by a variety of actors.31 The four catego-
ries are by no means mutually exclusive; on the con-
trary, they usually intersect. Accordingly, assigning all 
the forms of TOC that exist in one specific state to a 
single category is impossible. But the threats posed by 
TOC can be identified according to the four categories 
depending on the illegal market and the constellation 
of actors concerned. The conceptual differentiation 
ensures that individual challenges associated with 
TOC in fragile states are not viewed in isolation, as 
each measure targeted primarily towards one specific 
threat category can also have an impact on the others. 
It is important, therefore, to identify possible side ef-
fects and trade-offs in order to reach, at the very least, 
an informed decision on priorities in dealing with TOC. 
TOC as an external stressor  
The threat of violence and decay in fragile states is 
often linked to specific pressure factors or stressors. 
TOC is usually classed as an external stressor which, 
like a virus, infects and further destabilizes already 
weak states. Sometimes, certain illegal contact and 
transmission routes, and the TOC associated with 
them, are regarded as particularly dangerous; exam-
ples are illicit financial flows, international drug 
trafficking and the trade in conflict resources.32 The 
states’ limited resilience plays the key role here, com-
bined with the dynamics of global value chains – licit 
and illicit. From this perspective, the fact that fragile 
states are usually the weakest parts of the internation-
al market exacerbates their vulnerability as risks of 
globalization and illicit economies tend to gravitate 
 
31  Midgley, Briscoe and Bertoli, Identifying Approaches (see 
note 24), 10. 
32  Tim Midgley, Larry Attree, Thomas Wheeler and Hannah 
Vaughan-Lee, Defining and Measuring the External Stress Factors 
that Lead to Conflict in the Context of the Post-2015 Agenda, Conflict, 
Crime, and Violence Results Initiative (CCVRI) (London: 
Department for International Development et al., April 2014), 
7f. and 10. 
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towards them.33 The main drivers are market condi-
tions and forces, as well as criminal networks, most 
of which are based outside fragile states. These states 
then fall into the crime trap, with economic inputs 
being sucked steadily into the criminal economy.34 
The attraction of fragile states for TOC lies primarily 
in their porous borders, weak regulatory environment 
and utterly inadequate law enforcement. These states 
are of little importance as markets in the internation-
al context, but criminal networks can operate here 
with minimal resistance and to a large extent with im-
punity, meaning that fragile states are relevant pri-
marily as transit zones, resource suppliers and, if need 
be, as safe havens. Various Central American countries 
are often-cited examples of how drug and human 
trafficking and other criminal activities negatively 
impact on statehood. Here, several countries that 
regained political stability a little while ago are now 
facing the decay of the state, whose institutions lack 
the strength to face the penetration by TOC.35 In other 
words, external stressors amplify existing problems 
and increase the risks of insecurity and violence. Of 
course, international organized crime and global 
economic instability are creating new threats for the 
world as a whole,36 but fragile states are particularly 
vulnerable to them. 
Possible responses include, firstly, reforms to the 
global regulatory framework, with a particular focus 
on improving legislation and monitoring, and, second-
ly, strengthening or building the capacity of fragile 
states. The problem with the first approach is that the 
global regulatory level is far removed from the local 
arena in which these regulations must take effect. 
Implementing and enforcing international standards 
ultimately remains the responsibility of national 
governments.37 For that reason too, more efforts are 
now being made to assist fragile states with deterrence 
– either directly through joint operations or indirectly 
through advice, training and equipment, mainly for 
the police and the criminal justice system.38 Deter-
 
33  OECD, Think Global, Act Global (see note 12), 56. 
34  James Cockayne calls this scenario a “junky economy” 
(“Breaking the Crime Trap” [see note 13]). 
35  Jorge Montaño, quoted in World Development Report 2011 
(see note 11), 10. Montaño was a member of the International 
Narcotics Control Board until 2013 and sits on the WDR 
Advisory Council. 
36  World Bank, World Development Report 2011 (see note 11), 38. 
37  Midgley, Briscoe and Bertoli, Identifying Approaches (see 
note 24), 38. 
38  A further entry point is economic transformation, which 
would put fragile states in a stronger economic position. This 
rence can also be achieved through administrative 
measures such as the withdrawal of licences and the 
imposition of financial penalties; so there is also scope 
to cooperate with public authorities in fragile states 
responsible for such acts.39 
States’ resilience can be strengthened in a variety of 
ways. Yet when efforts are made to boost protection 
from TOC as an external stressor, deterrence measures 
are often given priority, based on the assumption that 
TOC mostly worsens existing problems such as corrup-
tion, possibly even leading to state failure. The specific 
dynamics and stakeholders in the countries themselves 
are of secondary importance in this line of argument. 
As a consequence, the political economy and the link-
age between organized criminal networks and power 
structures in the fragile states tend to be neglected, 
not least because these illicit relationships are often 
impenetrable to outsiders, as well as being a highly 
sensitive issue in the context of international coopera-
tion. But capacity building of a primarily technical 
nature may not only be ineffective, but can also have 
unintended consequences if, for example, it strength-
ens the capacities of institutions that have already 
been co-opted by criminal networks. Even if new struc-
tures, such as special units to combat TOC, are estab-
lished, there is no guarantee that they will function in 
the medium to long term or that they will not become 
entangled in illicit activities themselves. 
On the other hand, successful capacity building 
can lead to an escalation of violence. If there is a real 
strengthening of law enforcement, international 
criminal networks will shift their operations elsewhere 
if possible. But particularly those groups based in the 
country itself may respond with violence if they be-
lieve their business operations to be at risk. Some-
times, more intensive pressure from law enforcement 
agencies causes the fragmentation of existing net-
works and the emergence of new configurations and 
rivalries, resulting in violence within or between 
criminal organizations. Furthermore, illicit activities 
 
is also mentioned by Midgley, Briscoe and Bertoli, Identifying 
Approaches (see note 24). Here, however, the impact pathway is 
very difficult to follow, so this approach is discussed solely in 
the context of the fourth threat category.  
39  On this issue and on the deterrence approach more 
generally, see Sander Huisman, “Appendix 3: Deterrence as a 
Security Concept against Organised Crime”, in Frans-Paul van 
der Putten, Minke Meijnders and Jan Rood, Deterrence as a 
Security Concept against Non-traditional Threats, In-depth Study, 
Clingendael Monitor (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of 
International Relations Clingendael, June 2015), 48. 
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and actors may enjoy more legitimacy in the eyes of 
some parts of society than the state itself. In such 
circumstances, expanding and strengthening the 
state’s capacities may be viewed negatively, especially 
if this action leads to income losses for certain groups. 
These potential trade-offs are not an argument against 
capacity building per se, but such an approach must 
be weighed up against the background of other threats 
that TOC poses in fragile states.  
TOC as an economy of violence 
The threat mentioned most frequently in connection 
with TOC in fragile states is probably its linkage to 
violent actors who are in competition with the state. 
These links generally arise when non-state armed 
groups control areas in which they tax or provide pro-
tection for licit and illicit economic activity or engage 
in criminal activities themselves. Fragility, then, does 
not simply mean the absence of the state but the pres-
ence of forces which challenge the monopoly of force 
in a very real way.40  
The sources of funding for armed actors have 
changed, particularly since the end of the Cold War. 
In place of support from powerful states, there is 
now, in many cases, the trade in conflict goods such 
as drugs, diamonds and oil.41 Armed groups have to 
engage in cross-border cooperation with business-
people and middlemen to ensure that these goods 
reach the world markets. Not all these configurations 
can be described as TOC. However, “[s]hadow econo-
mies engaged in violent conflicts often feature mafia 
structures, gangs of organized criminals or, generally, 
actors who exercised control over shadow sectors of 
the economy even before the war to finance an armed 
rebellion, for instance”.42 The boundaries between 
war and serious violent crime are generally blurred,43 
 
40  Jörn Grävingholt, Claudia Hofmann and Stephan Klinge-
biel, Development Cooperation and Non-State Armed Groups, Studies 
29 (Bonn: German Development Institute, 2007), 23. 
41  Daniel Lambach, “Das veränderte Gesicht innerstaatlicher 
Konflikte”, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (online), 3 Febru-
ary 2014, www.bpb.de/internationales/weltweit/ innerstaatli-
che-konflikte/54556/veraenderte-konflikte (accessed 8 Sep-
tember 2015). 
42  Grävingholt, Hofmann and Klingebiel, Development 
Cooperation and Non-State Armed Groups (see note 40), 63. 
43  On this issue, see, for example Sabine Kurtenbach and 
Peter Lock, “Kriege als (Über)Lebenswelten. Schattenglobali-
sierung, Kriegsökonomien und Inseln der Zivilität”, in Kriege 
als (Über)Lebenswelten. Schattenglobalisierung, Kriegsökonomien und 
for armed actors tend to have diverse motives which 
often change over time. Not only might the revenue 
derived by non-state violent actors from illicit business 
activity prolong or worsen a conflict; the economic 
motives may in some cases become an end in them-
selves if, for example, the insurgents are unable to 
seize central power. Nor is a civil war required for TOC 
to turn to non-state violent actors – which can include 
private security firms or urban gangs – to protect their 
profits. Such a linkage between economic interests 
and competing authority can equally create econo-
mies of violence. The basic scheme is that monies from 
illicit business operations flow into non-state protec-
tion and control structures – which may or may not 
have been established specifically for this purpose. 
This creates the risk of an expansion, or at least an 
entrenchment, of state and human insecurity and 
perhaps even a regional spillover of instability.  
The primary strategy for engaging with TOC, then, 
is in most cases to decouple business from violence. 
The common feature of all the measures is that they 
aim to reduce or end the violence. The pathways 
towards this objective vary, however, depending on 
the type and extent of the link between violent actors 
and crime. One option is to work towards modifying 
the behaviour of organized criminal groups as a means 
of minimizing the negative impacts on security and 
decreasing the intensity of the conflict. This is more 
about addressing the harmful effects of the criminal 
activities rather than curbing these activities alto-
gether. Examples of this approach include agreements 
with violent (criminal) groups, and the selective tar-
geting of only the most violent crimes.44 Thus, vio-
lence is curbed, to a large extent, by leaving certain 
criminal business operations untouched. 
Another strategy focuses on drying up the violent 
actors’ irregular sources of income, e.g. by imposing 
embargoes and other sanctions. The aim is to deprive 
armed groups of the resources needed to perpetuate 
the violence. Frequently, this is accompanied by efforts 
to reach a negotiated settlement, in order to end mili-
tant activities and the conflict in general. In exchange 
for a renunciation of violence, the actors usually gain 
access to government positions and resources. The 
response to non-state violent actors’ challenge to the 
monopoly of force, then, is either acceptance of limited 
 
Inseln der Zivilität, ed. Sabine Kurtenbach and Peter Lock, Eine 
Welt, Schriftenreihe der Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, 
vol. 16 (Bonn, 2004), 20–37 (24). 
44  Midgley, Briscoe and Bertoli, Identifying Approaches (see 
note 24), 20ff. 
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state authority in certain spheres, or the integration of 
these same violent actors in the state apparatus. Ex-
perience has shown that these approaches are often 
preceded by an escalation of violence in which the 
state’s inability to assert its authority effectively across 
its entire territory becomes only too clear.  
The focus then shifts to decoupling the (structures 
of) violence from the criminal business operations, al-
beit leaving the illicit activities themselves untouched. 
The reality is that even with the integration of armed 
groups into government structures, the business prac-
tices themselves do not, as a rule, disappear. The main 
point of criticism is that reducing or ending violence 
in this way can cause the state to forfeit some of its 
legitimacy – for decoupling violence and business gen-
erally takes place through arrangements which grant 
the criminals or violent actors some measure of recog-
nition, whether as direct negotiating partners or via 
more informal agreements.45 This has become espe-
cially apparent in the government-negotiated truces 
between gangs in El Salvador. In exchange for the 
pledge of a reduction in violence, imprisoned gang 
members were granted less restrictive conditions of 
detention. The murder rate then decreased. None-
theless, the medium-term effect of such agreements is 
highly contentious.46 A low or decreasing level of vio-
lence can also be a manifestation of strong enmeshing 
of the state with TOC, with officials becoming part of 
criminal networks as protectors and/or dealers. At the 
start of peace processes in particular, such links are 
often accepted as the price to be paid for stabilization. 
However, they pose the risk that political reforms and 
better service provision by the state will be impeded, 
resulting in the (re)production of structures that are 
regarded as a key cause of insecurity and instability. 
Furthermore, this approach may even create incen-
tives for external TOC to step up its engagement as 
the risk of prosecution is reduced due to the arrange-
ments. 
 
45  Sanctions of various types are an exception since their 
purpose is to temporarily interrupt flows of goods and 
money, but they are not intended to combat or transform 
illicit business operations per se. 
46  For arguments for and against the truce in El Salvador 
and neighbouring countries, see, for example, Michael Loh-
muller, “Should El Salvador Renew the Gang Truce?”, InSight 
Crime (online), 3 August 2015, www.insightcrime.org/news-
analysis/new-study-offers-guidance-for-future-latam-gang-
truces (accessed 8 September 2015). 
TOC as state capture47 
A further threat associated with TOC is the waning 
legitimacy and possible erosion of the fragile state, 
resulting from the entanglement of state institutions 
and criminal networks discussed above. This does 
not simply involve individual acts of corruption, but 
the general connection of public offices with private 
interests. In such configurations, elites manipulate 
internal and external actors’ access to legal and illegal 
markets.48 This also provides the basis for emerging 
“protection economies” for criminals who are inter-
twined with the state; indeed, in some cases public 
officials are directly involved in illegal businesses. In 
relation to sub-Saharan Africa in particular, clien-
telism and patronage systems have repeatedly been 
identified as significant gateways for criminal inter-
ests – with the potential risk of a criminalization of 
entire states and political arenas.49 Indeed, there are 
fears that private syndicates are eroding state institu-
tions.50 One study on the impact of organized crime 
on governance in developing countries emphasizes 
that “political and public sector corruption has al-
lowed organized crime to develop or flourish, under-
mining the legitimacy of state institutions, and pro-
 
47  Originally, the concept of “state capture” was applied 
mainly to oligarchs who, during periods of transition, mani-
pulated policy formation and even shaped the emerging rules 
of the game to their own advantage (see, for example, Joel 
Hellman and Daniel Kaufmann, “Confronting the Challenge 
of State Capture in Transition Economies”, Finance & Develop-
ment 38, no. 3 [September 2001]). However, the concept was 
subsequently broadened and applied to a diverse range of 
actors outside private companies. The influencing of decision-
making and rule-setting processes by TOC is also a familiar 
phenomenon. In the following, the expression refers to TOC 
“capturing” the state in a broader sense in order to protect 
profits and buy influence. 
48  William Reno, “Mafiya Troubles, Warlord Crises”, in 
Beyond State Crisis? Postcolonial Africa and Post-Soviet Eurasia in 
Comparative Perspective, ed. Mark R. Beissinger and Crawford 
Young (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 
105–27 (110). 
49  The entanglement of crime with the state and politics in 
Africa were already being investigated in the 1990s; see, in 
particular, Jean-François Bayart, Stephen Ellis and Béatrice 
Hibou, The Criminalization of the State in Africa, African Issues 
(Oxford and Bloomington, 1999). However, the authors point 
out that despite fairly strong links between crime and 
politics/public office, none of the countries studied can be 
described as fully criminalized (see, inter alia, 29). 
50  Reno, “Mafiya Troubles” (see note 48), 107. 
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viding limited incentives for citizens not to engage in, 
or benefit from, organized crime.”51 
The focus here is on the lack of legitimacy of state 
structures that have links to transnational criminal 
actors. Rather than being entirely absent, the state 
and its decision-makers perform functions other than 
those officially envisaged. Government officials and 
politicians, instead of serving the public, provide 
services or protection for criminals and other actors 
who are willing to pay. “Abuse of public office” and 
“official complicity” are common terms used to en-
capsulate these relations in a normative sense.52 In 
such contexts, the public tends to have very little 
confidence in state institutions and may even regard 
them as a source of insecurity, particularly if TOC’s 
capture of the state and politics is well-advanced. 
Violence can occur in such circumstances but in a 
strong “protection economy”, it is rarely needed to 
enforce criminal interests. In many settings where 
organized crime is prevalent, it is the absence of vio-
lence that should be of concern, as this indicates a 
political-criminal “settlement”.53 Instability can of 
course be a consequence of the steady erosion of the 
state’s legitimacy, which occurs when TOC infiltrates 
the state’s structural composition.54 The threat posed 
by the crime-politics nexus consists not only in 
increased corruption and widespread patronage, but 
also a power shift in favour of criminal networks. 
In order to prevent or mitigate state capture, the 
key priority is to impede the formation of links be-
tween politics, the state and organized crime. Above 
all, this refers to procedures for making political and 
administrative processes more transparent. Options 
include establishing supervisory bodies, introducing 
or better enforcing rules on political party funding, 
and promoting an independent media. Policy plat-
forms on TOC and codes of conduct for parties can 
also help to make the political process more immune 
to the influence of TOC.55 However, bringing to light 
and curbing the generally clandestine interaction 
between the state, politics and organized crime comes 
with a number of risks. The crushing or disruption of 
“settlements” can precipitate violence – especially if 
 
51  Getting Smart, ed. Kavanagh (see note 16), 14. 
52  OECD, Think Global, Act Global (see note 12), 49. 
53  Getting Smart, ed. Kavanagh (see note 16), 19. 
54  Paula Miraglia, Rolando Ochoa and Ivan Briscoe, Trans-
national Organised Crime and Fragile States: A Thematic Paper 
Supporting the OECD DAC INCAF Project “Global Factors Influencing 
the Risk of Conflict and Fragility” (Paris, October 2012), 4. 
55  Getting Smart, ed. Kavanagh (see note 16), 21. 
these changes occur suddenly – largely due to the in-
creased role of non-state violent actors in subsequently 
providing protection (again) or due to resistance from 
factions within the security forces that have links to 
criminal networks. This puts civil society actors such 
as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and jour-
nalists, who have a key role to play in supporting this 
approach through their watchdog function, in a dan-
gerous position. In addition, merely changing the 
rules and revealing the links brings few benefits un-
less there are real consequences for those implicated. 
Indeed, it can further undermine state legitimacy 
if the involvement of state actors is revealed but no 
action is taken. And finally, it must also be kept in 
mind that measures which impede the formation of 
links between the state and TOC may be conducive 
to the incursion of more professional criminal net-
works from elsewhere which are capable of establish-
ing more sophisticated “front” business structures in 
fragile states.  
TOC as a world of existence/survival56 
Not only can organized crime have strong links with 
the state; it can also substitute for it. Here, a distinc-
tion must be made between statehood and the provi-
sion of public goods. The latter can be delivered by a 
multitude of actors,57 in some cases including crimi-
nal entrepreneurs if, for example, they invest in infra-
structure or provide local security.58 In the interna-
tional academic discourse, too, it is acknowledged that 
criminal networks can “govern”, even if this does not 
take place in a sustainable or fair manner.59 TOC may 
gain public legitimacy and popular support by acting 
as a “proxy” or substitute state.60 Particularly in the 
context of fragile statehood, therefore, the distinction 
between legality and legitimacy is important. Certain
 
56  The concept of “worlds of existence/survival” arose mainly 
in the context of wars, which become a sphere of existence 
“because alternative life chances in the regular economy 
appear to be out of reach” (Kurtenbach and Lock, Kriege als 
(Über)Lebenswelten [see note 43], 24). 
57  Stephen D. Krasner and Thomas Risse, “External Actors, 
State-Building, and Service Provision in Areas of Limited 
Statehood: Introduction”, Governance: An International Journal of 
Policy, Administration, and Institutions 27, no. 4 (October 2014), 
545–67 (550f.). 
58  Getting Smart, ed. Kavanagh (see note 16), 26. 
59  OECD, Think Global, Act Global (see note 12), 47. 
60  Miraglia, Ochoa and Briscoe, Transnational Organised Crime 
and Fragile States (see note 54), 10. 
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Transnational organized crime in fragile states 
How TOC works Reaction / Goal Approach Instruments 




Cooperation or capacity 
building in law enforce-
ment/criminal justice sector, 
e.g. establishing special anti-
TOC units 




Negotiation with armed 
groups; sanctions; selected 
targeting of particularly 
violent activities/actors 
State capture Impede the formation 
of links between 







codes of conduct; disclosure 
of party and election cam-
paign funding; dialogue 
platforms 
World of existence / 
survival 
Reduce the role of TOC 




Better information about 





practices which are officially criminalized may have 
been an essential part of the local economy for some 
time and may be regarded as legitimate; one example 
is the smuggling of various locally consumed goods. 
This applies especially if these activities provide a sur-
vival strategy or opportunities for advancement for 
demographic groups which otherwise have very 
limited economic prospects.61 Traditional smuggling 
routes and the – in some cases highly specialized – 
actors who operate them can also be utilized by inter-
national criminal networks. Furthermore, it should be 
borne in mind that TOC is also associated with legal 
activities which often operate through informal, 
locally embedded institutions that can easily become 
criminalized.62 Some TOC actors also directly supply 
 
61  James Cockayne and Adam Lupel, “Conclusion: From Iron 
Fist to Invisible Hand. Peace Operations, Organized Crime 
and Intelligent International Law Enforcement”, International 
Peacekeeping 16, no. 1 (2009), 151–68 (153). 
62  Günther Maihold and Markus Hochmüller, “Einleitung: 
Von failed states und Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit – Orga-
nisierte Kriminalität, Gewalt und Staat in Lateinamerika”, in 
Gewalt, Organisierte Kriminalität und Staat in Lateinamerika, ed. 
Günther Maihold and Daniel Brombacher (Opladen, Berlin 
and Toronto: Barbara Budrich, 2013), 9–23 (19). 
goods and services to communities which have little 
or no access to state resources, e.g. due to their ethnic-
ity or social status. Under these conditions, represen-
tatives of criminal networks can count on at least a 
measure of support from within society – even if the 
substantial profits from these activities mainly flow to 
the criminals themselves and may in some cases be 
detrimental to the community at large.  
The primary goal of some initiatives, therefore, is 
to withdraw community support to TOC. This can be 
achieved through better information about the impact 
of TOC, through local initiatives against practices like 
protection racketeering, and by improved trust be-
tween security agencies and citizens, e.g. through 
community policing.63 One commonly mentioned 
problem is that more intensive law enforcement 
against TOC often results in livelihood deprivation for 
some demographic groups at the lower end of the 
value chain, with no alternatives being available to 
them. Another possible response to TOC, therefore, 
may be to promote economic transformation at the 
local level, e.g. by providing more public services in 
 
63  Midgley, Briscoe and Bertoli, Identifying Approaches (see 
note 24), 26. 
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the health and education sectors, developing employ-
ment programmes, and giving local communities 
improved access to legal markets and resources.64 In 
addition to alternative development programmes, 
another possible instrument addressing TOC’s impact 
on society are projects to mitigate harm, for example 
the health impacts of the drug trade or efforts to the 
decriminalize certain minor criminal offences.65 
However, this type of measures has little impact on 
the incentives for TOC and the protection economies 
with which it is associated. The transformation ap-
proaches outlined above take time to have an effect 
and therefore pose no direct threat to criminal net-
works’ profits or leaving plenty of scope for them to 
make the appropriate adjustments to their operations. 
In fragile states in particular, locally embedded TOC 
or protection racketeers are integrated into patronage 
networks which permeate the entire political system. 
In such cases, the withdrawal of popular support with-
out accompanying reforms can pose a real threat by 
creating scope for power shifts. By contrast, TOC activ-
ities which are largely driven from the outside and 
tend to generate much higher profits are less affected 
by this type of approach. The understanding of TOC as 
a basis for livelihood is important primarily in antici-
pating unintended consequences of initiatives which 
focus on strengthening state capacity, authority and/ 
or legitimacy. Under certain circumstances, it may 
therefore be useful to give precedence to transforma-
tion, e.g. if TOC is an important source of income for 
marginalized groups. However, it is important to 
strike a balance between the stabilizing effects of TOC 
and the associated harm to the community and the 




64  Ibid., 30. 
65  Ibid., 20f. 
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Illicit economies in West Africa. 
TOC and statehood in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone 
 
The development relevance of TOC and its impacts is 
now well-known, as is the range of instruments avail-
able to deal with the related challenges. In order to 
be able to set priorities for bilateral development 
cooperation in fragile states, however, the specific im-
pacts of, and threats posed by, TOC must first be de-
fined systematically so that unintended consequences 
can be avoided. This process is context-dependent and 
its outcomes naturally vary, but it can be guided by 
the four threat categories described above. The follow-
ing analysis of TOC in West Africa, therefore, is not 
based on a study of individual illegal markets or 
affected countries but looks at the significance of the 
four threat categories for various criminal activities. 
It covers all relevant illicit economies66 in the focus 
countries Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea. All three 
countries are generally assessed as fragile, inter alia 
by the OECD and by Germany in the context of its 
development cooperation.67 Furthermore, all three are 
members of g7+, an association of countries affected 
by conflict and fragility which was set up within 
the framework of the New Deal for Engagement in 
Fragile States. Indeed, Liberia and Sierra Leone have 
both emerged from many years of civil war,68 while 
Guinea experienced military rule which culminated in 
 
66  Illicit economies encompass economic transactions and 
trade in commodities of which the production and/or market-
ing are prohibited by law unless certain regulations and 
standards are complied with. “Organized criminal groups are 
generally (but not exclusively) the key operators of illicit 
economies, given the requirement for high levels of organiza-
tion to facilitate and protect repeated transactions”, Mark 
Shaw and Fiona Mangan, Illicit Trafficking and Libya’s Transition: 
Profits and Losses (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of 
Peace, 2014), 7. 
67  OECD, List of Fragile States and Economies Used for Preparing 
the 2015 OECD Report on States of Fragility, www.oecd.org/dac/ 
governance-peace/conflictandfragility/docs/List%20of%20 
fragile%20states.pdf. In the context of its development co-
operation, Germany groups the three countries together with 
Côte d’Ivoire in its Fragile States in West Africa programme; 
see the BMZ’s table of cooperation countries: www.bmz.de/de/ 
was_wir_machen/laender_regionen/laenderliste/index.html 
(both websites accessed on 8 September 2015). 
68  In Liberia from 1989 to 2003, with a hiatus from 1996 to 
1999; in Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2002. 
a bloody massacre in 2009.69 After these periods of 
instability, all three countries underwent political 
transitions, the last of which officially ended in 
Guinea with the 2013 parliamentary elections and the 
recognition of their results. As these are neighbouring 
countries, all located along the West African coast, 
there are numerous political and economic links – 
licit and illicit – between them. Due to these similari-
ties and links, the analysis looks at all three countries 
simultaneously with regard to how TOC works and 
the related threats.70 However, differences between 
these countries and their domestic developments are 
explained whenever this is relevant for the purpose 
of this study.  
Global and regional drivers  
Due to their economic parameters, poor infrastructure 
and general insecurity, countries like Liberia, Sierra 
Leone and Guinea are not per se attractive for organ-
ized crime. On a global scale, they have little signifi-
cance as markets, particularly for high-price goods 
such as hard drugs, gold and diamonds.71 They are 
mainly of interest as transit zones or starting points 
for illicit trade flows or as a source of commodities.72 
 
69  For background, see Human Rights Watch, Waiting for 
Justice: Accountability before Guinea’s Courts for the September 28, 
2009 Stadium Massacre, Rapes, and Other Abuses (December 2012). 
70  The aim, therefore, is not to establish causality in a nar-
rower sense but to depict, in a systematic way, the various 
types of illicit economies in the three countries and identify 
the ensuing threats posed by TOC in contexts of fragile 
statehood. 
71  The Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money 
Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) notes that intensive money 
laundering also tends to take place in countries such as Côte 
d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal, see WACD, Not Just in 
Transit (see note 8), 27. Since money laundering, in addition, 
takes place downstream from other criminal activites and 
little reliable information is available about illicit financial 
flows in the three focus countries, this field of activity is not 
discussed in detail below. 
72  In addition, illicit dumping of electronic and hazardous 
waste along the West African coast and in larger cities also 
takes place on a massive scale. On e-waste dumping, see inter 
alia Kwesi Aning, Sampson B. Kwarkye and John Pokoo, “A Case 
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The most important illicit goods trafficked from or 
through the three focus countries are natural re-
sources and drugs, particularly South American 
cocaine destined for Europe. According to the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), crime 
related to the trafficking of cocaine and natural 
resources poses the greatest threat to the stability of 
West African states in general.73 These are also the 
sectors in which the forms of TOC that act as the 
strongest external stressors can be observed. 
Overall, the trafficking of South American cocaine 
through West Africa has noticeably increased in the 
last 10 years. This shift was due to the growth in 
demand for cocaine in Europe, falling demand in the 
US, and more stringent surveillance along the route 
through the Caribbean.74 As drugs such as cocaine are 
illegal goods, trafficking is by its very nature a crimi-
nal activity and tends to be dominated by TOC. In 
2008, flagrant cases of drug trafficking came to light 
in all three focus countries. Guinea in particular had 
become an important hub for South American cocaine 
under President Lansana Conté. After his death in 
late 2008 and a military coup, the new leader Moussa 
Dadis Camara used sometimes drastic methods to 
crush the trade. At its peak, roughly between 2006 and 
2008, planes laden with cocaine were landing at air-
strips across the country with impunity, similar to the 
scenario in neighbouring Guinea-Bissau. The trade was 
apparently controlled by South Americans, mainly 
Colombians.75 After seizing power, Camara paraded 
numerous members of the former government and 
foreign nationals who had been arrested for their 
alleged involvement in drug trafficking, including 
Nigerians and Ghanaians, on TV. This public pillorying 
was to a large extent politically motivated, although it 
seems likely that many of the accused were genuinely 
 
Study of Ghana”, in Getting Smart, ed. Kavanagh (see note 16), 
97–134 (114ff.). 
73  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 
Crime and Instability: Case Studies of Transnational Threats (Vienna, 
February 2010), 16. 
74  Due to the nature of the trade, precise figures are not 
available; however, the amount of pure cocaine transiting 
through West Africa for Europe in 2010 was an estimated 18 
tonnes, with a value of USD 1.25 billion, UNODC, Transnation-
al Organized Crime in West Africa: A Threat Assessment (Vienna, 
February 2013), 17. 
75  Interviews GUI-9_24-7-14; GUI-15_30-7-14; GUI-12_25-7-14; 
for an explanation of the interview reference numbers, see 
note 25. 
implicated.76 As a consequence, Guinea’s links to drug 
trafficking were briefly interrupted. However, this 
disentanglement was short-lived, not least because 
Camara’s presidency ended less than a year later with 
an attempt on his life. 
Unlike neighbouring Guinea, Sierra Leone and 
Liberia have not been identified as important hubs in 
cocaine trafficking. Nonetheless, Sierra Leone gained 
notoriety in 2008 with the discovery of around 700 
kilos of cocaine on a Cessna plane from Venezuela that 
had landed at the airport in the capital Freetown. 
Apart from 11 Sierra Leoneans, a number of foreign 
nationals, including Colombians, Mexicans, a Ven-
ezuelan and an American were subsequently arrested. 
Before they could be charged, however, new legisla-
tion had to be enacted. In Liberia, the ship Blue Atlantic, 
with a Ghanaian crew and 2.5 tonnes of cocaine on 
board, was intercepted off the coast by a French naval 
vessel and towed to port.77 Although the drugs were 
not destined for Liberia, the case revealed the weak-
nesses in Liberia’s legislation and criminal justice 
system, as possession and trafficking of drugs were 
tried under the Public Health Act with insignificant 
fines.78 New legislation did not come into force until 
2014. Guinea still does not have a specific drug law, 
which means that cocaine traffickers can easily “buy 
their way out” while people who are caught with 
small quantities of drugs – mainly cannabis – are often 
in prison for longer periods since they are unable to 
pay the fine or bribe.79 Furthermore, law enforcement 
capacities – especially as regards investigation and 
evidence-gathering – are extremely limited in all three 
focus countries, and access to forensic technology is 
minimal or non-existent. Thus in Sierra Leone, the 
case known as the Lungi affair was pursued solely 
thanks to judicial and investigative support from the 
United Kingdom and the United Nations.80 In Liberia, 
the Blue Atlantic case and the prosecution of crew 
 
76  Lansana Gberie, Crime, Violence, and Politics: Drug Trafficking 
and Counternarcotics Policies in Mali and Guinea (Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2015), 10f. 
77  Interviews LIB-3_13-11-2013; LIB-51_5-12-13. 
78  United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Midterm Report of 
the Panel of Experts on Liberia Submitted Pursuant to Paragraph 5(b) 
of Security Council Resolution 2128 (2013), S/2014/363 (23 May 
2014), 21; the new Controlled Drugs and Substances Act was 
finally signed into law by the Liberian President in October 
2014. 
79  Camino Kavanagh, Harmonizing Drug Legislation in West 
Africa – A Call for Minimum Standards, WACD Background Paper 
No. 9 (Geneva: WACD, 2014), 11f. 
80  WACD, Not Just in Transit (see note 8), 16. 
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members collapsed when the Supreme Court over-
turned the convictions due to lack of evidence.81 In 
another case, a Sierra Leonean drug kingpin was 
arrested in Liberia in a joint operation with the US 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in 2010 and 
put on trial in the US.82 Overall, the picture which 
emerged in the West African states was one of pre-
dominantly external networks encountering weak or 
non-existent drug laws and painfully under-resourced 
law enforcement agencies.  
Even so, for a long time there was no sense of 
urgency within the region, precisely because drug 
trafficking mainly occurred as transit of cocaine by 
external networks and was rarely regarded as a stress 
factor in the countries themselves. However, in its 
2014 report, the West Africa Commission on Drugs 
pointed out the negative consequences of this branch 
of organized crime for West Africa, including an in-
crease in drug consumption.83 Furthermore, the trans-
national criminal networks not only use the cover 
of legitimate businesses in their operations, but also 
have links to senior officials.84 More transactions also 
appear to be taking place in the region itself, with 
less direct involvement of South American networks.85 
It is also important to consider the longstanding as-
sumption that the mafia-type structures which domi-
nate drug trafficking in Latin America or Italy are 
largely absent in Africa; instead, the trade is based on 
more decentralized, flexible and less hierarchical 
groups.86 
In all three focus countries, the common assump-
tion is that it is predominantly Nigerian networks that 
are implicated in trafficking since Nigerian mules are 
 
81  Interview LIB-26_26-11-13. 
82  United States Attorney Southern District of New York, 
“Sierra Leone Man Pleads Guilty in Manhattan Federal Court 
to International Narcotics Distribution Conspiracy”, Sierra 
Herald (online), 1 March 2011, www.sierraherald.com/cocaine-
us-trial-sesay.htm (accessed 22 August 2014). 
83  WACD, Not Just in Transit (see note 8), 9. 
84  Ibid., 12. 
85  Mark Shaw, Leadership Required: Drug Trafficking and the 
Crisis of Statehood in West Africa, ISS Policy Brief no. 37 (Pretoria: 
Institute for Security Studies [ISS], October 2012), 3. 
86  Bayart, Ellis and Hibou, The Criminalization of the State in 
Africa (see note 49), 11. Furthermore, there is the general 
international shift away from rather hierarchically struc-
tured groups that serve or perhaps even dominate a variety 
of markets towards more flexible and heterogeneous groups 
specializing in specific activities. On this trend, see inter alia 
Europol, SOCTA 2013, EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat 
Assessment, public version (The Hague, March 2013), 8. 
frequently apprehended at airports.87 The individual 
quantities of drugs being seized have generally de-
creased. However, the smaller amounts of cocaine 
being seized in West Africa are thought to reflect a 
change in traffickers’ strategies rather than a signifi-
cant reduction in the amount of the drug in transit.88 
Apparently, the traffickers having been making less 
use of light aircraft or ships to transport the drugs to 
Guinea and Sierra Leone recently and rely more on 
container vessels and drug mules on international 
flights. Ports and airports therefore continue to be 
important entry and exit points and, in all three coun-
tries, remain very vulnerable to trafficking despite 
international efforts to introduce more stringent con-
trols.89 
In Guinea, after the temporary hiatus following 
the coup, the organizations that dominated the drug 
trade before 2008 – including the South Americans – 
have obviously resumed operations.90 Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, by contrast, are not considered to be 
hubs in the cocaine trade which might in part be 
explained by the stronger international presence in 
these countries, mainly in the form of UN missions. 
Combating transnational organized crime formed 
part of the mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuild-
ing Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), for example, 
which began work in 2008 and was closed in 2014.91 
In Liberia, measures to combat the drug trade have at 
least been integrated into the implementation of the 
existing UN mandate since 2008.92 Despite all these 
adjustments and missions’ general evolution towards 
complex multidimensionality – evident from these 
expanded mandates – peace operations are still seen 
as ill-equipped to deal with organized crime.93 None-
theless, they do have a deterrent effect, thanks to the 
presence not only of blue helmets but also of UN 
 
87  Interviews LIB-23_25-11-13; LIB-20_22-11-13; LIB-31_27-11-
13; LIB-46_3-12-13; SL-12_23-1-14. 
88  UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa (see 
note 74). 
89  Interviews GUI-15_30-7-14; GUI-9_24-7-14; SL-13_23-1-14; 
SL-4_17-1-14; LIB-14_20-11-13; LIB-20_22-11-13. 
90  Interviews GUI-15_30-7-14; GUI-12_25-7-14; GUI-23_2-8-14. 
91  UNSC, Final Report of the Secretary-General on UNIPSIL, S/2014/ 
192 (17 March 2014), 1. 
92  Wibke Hansen, Mehr Interaktion als geplant. Friedenseinsätze 
und Organisierte Kriminalität in fragilen Staaten, Wissenschaftli-
che Schriften der WWU Münster, Reihe VII, vol. 12 (Münster, 
2013), 206. 
93  Walter Kemp, Mark Shaw and Arthur Boutellis, The 
Elephant in the Room: How Can Peace Operations Deal with Organized 
Crime? (New York: IPI, June 2013), 1. 
Global and regional drivers 
SWP Berlin 






police and the generally more intensive international 
monitoring of the security situation. For example, the 
reports by the UN Panel of Experts on Liberia – whose 
purpose is to monitor implementation of the sanc-
tions imposed on the country – have also yielded a 
wealth of information about illicit activities. With the 
impending withdrawal of the UN missions from Sierra 
Leone and Liberia94, there have been concerns that the 
security situation could deteriorate, which have been 
exacerbated by the Ebola epidemic.  
In the natural resources sector, TOC occurs as a 
particularly powerful external stressor in the context 
of industrial fishing.95 Firstly, the strong demand for 
fishery products in other regions of the world, notably 
Europe and Asia, is driving up illegal fishing on a 
massive scale. Secondly, unauthorized fishing off West 
Africa is undertaken almost exclusively by vessels 
from outside the region. It is estimated that the West 
African coastal states lose up to USD 1.5 billion a year 
as a result of illegal fishing.96 It is no coincidence that 
in the EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea, adopted in 
March 2014, illegal, unreported and unregulated 
(IUU) fishing97 is right at the top of the list of threats – 
ahead of trafficking of human beings, narcotics and 
arms.98 Indeed, West African waters are estimated to 
have the highest levels of IUU fishing in the world.99 
Many of the region’s artisanal fishermen also work 
without a licence, but the really organized forms of 
 
94  The UN Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone closed in 
March 2014. The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) will undergo 
a phased withdrawal, with the Liberian Government expected 
to assume full responsibility for security from June 2016. 
95  On the classification of illegal fishing as organized crime, 
see the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized 
Crime (GI)/The Black Fish, The Illegal Fishing and Organized Crime 
Nexus: Illegal Fishing as Transnational Organized Crime, Lead 
Author: Teale N. Phelps Bondaroff (Geneva and Amsterdam, 
April 2015). 
96  Estimates range from USD 1 billion to as much as USD 1.5 
or 1.6 billion. See, for example, Africa Progress Panel, Grain, 
Fish, Money. Financing Africa’s Green and Blue Revolutions, Africa 
Progress Report 2014 (Geneva, 2014), or Environmental 
Justice Foundation (EJF), Pirate Fishing Exposed. The Fight against 
Illegal Fishing in West Africa and the EU (London, 2012). 
97  This includes not only illegal fishing but also unreported 
and unregulated practices such as false declaration of catches 
and the use of unmarked vessels. This report will mainly 
focus on illegal fishing as UU activities come to light less 
often in West Africa. 
98  Council of the European Union, EU Strategy on the Gulf of 
Guinea (17 March 2014), www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/ 
cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/141582.pdf (accessed 
10 September 2015). 
99  GI/Black Fish, Illegal Fishing (see note 95), 48. 
illegal fishing are conducted by large trawlers from 
Asia (mainly China and South Korea).100 Certain com-
panies stand out in particular, including the China 
National Fisheries Corporation, which was responsible 
for 33 per cent of total documented Chinese IUU cases 
in six West Africa countries during the periods 2000–
2006 and 2011–2013.101 Endangered and threatened 
species in particular can be sold at very high prices 
in Asian markets.102 Aside from the weakness in inter-
national law governing the high seas, it is fragile 
states’ inability to effectively regulate and monitor 
fisheries that attracts IUU fishing practices. 
Guinea seems to be worst affected by illegal fishing 
in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).103 The country 
loses an estimated u100–150 million annually – 
around 10 per cent of its national budget – as a result 
of illegal fishing.104 Since more stringent surveillance 
was introduced in the waters off Sierra Leone, the 
problem has apparently worsened off Guinea’s coast.105 
Guinea lacks both an effective vessel monitoring sys-
tem for the EEZ and a separate zone reserved exclu-
sively for artisanal fishermen.106 A fisheries inspec-
torate – the Centre National de Surveillance et de 
Protection des Pêches – exists but is poorly resourced 
and many of its official bases along the coast are not 
fully operational.107 In just one month, 16 illegal 
fishing cases committed by 12 Chinese-flagged and/ 
or owned vessels were documented by Greenpeace in 
 
100  Interviews LIB-24_25-11-13; LIB-31_27-11-13; SL-12_23-1-
14; SL-17_24-1-14. 
101  Greenpeace, Africa’s Fisheries’ Paradise at a Crossroads: 
Investigating Chinese Companies’ Illegal Fishing Practices in West 
Africa (Beijing and Dakar, May 2015), 2. 
102  GI/Black Fish, Illegal Fishing (see note 95), 22. 
103  In this zone, which extends up to 200 nautical miles 
from the territorial sea baseline, countries have sovereign 
rights relating to the economic exploitation of the waters and 
seabed, including fishing. 
104  Interview GUI-6_23-7-14. 
105  Environmental Justice Atlas, Illegal, Unreported and Unregu-
lated (IUU) Fishing in Sherbro River, Sierra Leone, April 2014 (last 
update), http://ejatlas.org/conflict/illegal-unreported-and-
unregulated-iuu-fishing-in-sherbro-river-sierra-leone (accessed 
12 June 2015). 
106  Interpol, Environmental Security Sub-Directorate, Study 
on Fisheries Crime in the West African Coastal Region (Lyon, Sep-
tember 2014), 46, 48, 51. 
107  Interviews GUI-13_29-7-14; GUI-25_5-8-14; see also Catha-
rina Lewerenz and Judith Vorrath, Illegale Fischerei und mariti-
me Sicherheit. Gegen Gefahren in Westafrika auf See und an Land 
vorgehen, SWP-Aktuell 76/2014 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, December 2014). 
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the waters of Guinea alone.108 Despite the improved 
surveillance in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the relevant 
authorities in these countries also still lack expertise 
and equipment. Penalties imposed for IUU fishing 
generally take the form of fines, which have very little 
deterrent effect.109 What’s more, fish from falsely 
declared catches from Guinea or Sierra Leone is still 
reaching Europe by circuitous routes.110 This causes 
substantial economic losses for the coastal states by 
depriving them of licence fees and export duties, and 
jobs in processing are lost as well.  
It is a similar scenario in the forestry sector, where 
demand for tropical timber in Europe and Asia inter-
sects with often inadequate regulation and poor forest 
management. Guinea has extensive forests but very 
few of them are formally protected. Due to the logis-
tical effort and relatively distant markets, it is often 
larger companies which are involved in illegal logging 
operations. Of the companies exporting timber from 
Guinea in 2011, fewer than half were allegedly licensed 
to do so.111 In Liberia, the illegal trade in timber was 
already a key element of the war economy in the 
1990s. The sector was reformed during the peace pro-
cess and the international embargo was lifted in 2006. 
In 2012, however, it emerged that the licence system 
was being circumvented through the issuing of private 
use permits (PUPs) to commercial companies as a new 
legal loophole. A PUP is a commercial forestry licence 
that was introduced to allow private landowners to 
utilize forest assets situated on their property.112 
Despite a moratorium on the issuing of PUPs, the ship-
ment of timber continued unabated. Among those 
involved was Atlantic Resources, a company linked to 
the Malaysian logging giant Samling.113 Similarly, 
 
108  Greenpeace, Africa’s Fisheries’ Paradise (see note 101), 2 and 
19. 
109  GI/Black Fish, Illegal Fishing (see note 95), 23. 
110  Interviews SL-17_24-1-14; GUI-6_23-7-14. 
111  “Environmentalists Want Illegal Logging Stopped in 
Guinea”, Illegal Logging Portal (online), 7 January 2011, 
www.illegal-logging.info/content/environmentalists-want-
illegal-logging-stopped-guinea (accessed 11 September 2015). 
112  Global Witness , Save My Future Foundation and Sus-
tainable Development Initiative, Signing Their Lives Away: 
Liberia’s Private Use Permits and the Destruction of Community-Owned 
Rainforest (September 2012); Special Independent Investigat-
ing Body (Liberia), Report on the Issuance of Private Use Permits 
(PUPs) (19 December 2012). 
113  Global Witness, Logging Company Flouts Liberian President’s 
Timber Export Ban and Drives Breakdown in Rule of Law (20 De-
cember 2012), www.globalwitness.org/library/logging-com 
pany-flouts-liberian-president%E2%80%99s-timber-export-ban-
and-drives-breakdown-rule-law (accessed 2 August 2014). 
Sierra Leone imposed a ban on timber exports in 
2008,114 but again it became clear that exports con-
tinued illegally, for example when 33 containers 
carrying timber were intercepted at the Freetown port 
in 2011.115 With strong demand growth in Asia, Chi-
nese organizations are believed to be behind many of 
the logging operations, whether as financiers or as 
exporters.116 A paper by the European Commission 
concludes that illegal logging in Sierra Leone is often 
managed by Lebanese from Guinea and Liberia, who 
obtain agreements with local chiefs.117 Unlike the 
fisheries sector, the timber trade, both legal and illegal, 
necessitates a far greater degree of cooperation with 
local authorities, transport companies and business 
partners. What’s more, most of the timber has to be 
shipped, and the sheer volume of the product means 
it is very difficult to evade the admittedly patchy 
controls at ports. Important drivers of illegal logging, 
such as demand, and the main hubs lie outside the 
region. In this sector, however, companies and actors 
from the West African countries themselves are in-
volved in the criminal business networks to a greater 
degree.  
Illicit gold and diamond mining and trafficking 
operations are even more firmly embedded in the 
countries. Again, the markets/international hubs in 
this trade are located in Europe and Asia, with Antwerp 
playing the key role for diamonds and Dubai one of 
the leading gold centres.118 Industrial mineral extrac-
tion is still at low levels in all three countries. Illicit 
gold and diamond mining activities are, in the main, 
small-scale or artisanal, with some semi-industrial 
mining which includes the use of light machinery. 
The precious stones or gold extracted in these mining 
activities are either legalized by being sold to a licensed 
dealer or exporter, generally via various staging posts, 
or are smuggled abroad. All three countries are partici-
pants in the Kimberley Process (KP), which aims to 
stop the trade in conflict diamonds through regulation 
 
114  Summer Walker and Elisa Burchert, “A Desk Study of 
Sierra Leone”, in Getting Smart, ed. Kavanagh (see note 16), 
161–96 (178). 
115  Nano Daily and AFP, “S. Leone Anti-graft Agency Stops 
Illegal Timber Exports”, Nano Daily (online), 10 February 2011, 
www.nanodaily.com/reports/SLeone_anti-graft_agency_stops_ 
illegal_timber_exports_999.html (accessed 22 August 2014). 
116  Interviews SL-27_29-1-14; SL-29_30-1-14; SL-47_8-2-14. 
117  European Commission, Cross-border Flows of Timber and 
Wood Products in West Africa, Final Report, authors: Hugh 
Blackett and Eric Gardette (20 October 2008), 59. 
118  Interview GUI-6_23-7-14. 
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and licensing.119 Initially, however, they implemented 
the KP requirements in different ways and did not 
harmonize their export duties. This provided incen-
tives for smuggling, with the result that there was a 
massive drop in exports from Sierra Leone after it 
increased its tax on precious stones, whereas exports 
from Guinea and Liberia noticeably increased.120 The 
report of the Review Mission to Liberia in March 2013 
also noted that there were clear indications of routine 
smuggling of Sierra Leonean diamonds into Liberia; 
in addition, diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire which were 
under a sanctions regime that embargoed the export 
were most likely being trafficked through Liberia.121 
The Mano River Union, a regional organization com-
prising Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire, 
therefore intensified its efforts to harmonize the regu-
lation and governance of the diamond trade as part 
of the implementation of the Kimberley Process. By 
comparison, government control over the gold sector 
is weaker in all three countries, and the trading of 
most of the gold extracted in these countries is be-
lieved to bypass the official system.122 
In these three West African countries, most activ-
ities in gold and diamond mining and trade rely on 
established relationships and informal rules.123 As 
these often carry more weight than official licensing 
procedures, the trade includes both licensed and illicit 
dealers or middlemen. Foreign investors who cannot 
rely on such networks frequently become the victims 
of fraud and are duped with fake diamonds or gold. 
A number of the criminal groups behind these scams 
are well-organized and have set up local companies to 
front their activities.124 Presumably, foreign investors 
also purchase gold and diamonds and smuggle them 
out of the country via ports and airports.125 However, 
very little reliable information is available about these 
activities as it is very easy to smuggle these goods on 
account of their small size and the extremely patchy 
 
119  For details, see the Kimberley Process website: 
www.kimberleyprocess.com (accessed 11 August 2014). 
120  Interviews SL-30_30-1-14; SC, SL-20_27-1-14. 
121  Cited in UNSC, Midterm Report of the Panel of Experts on 
Liberia (see note 78), 18. 
122  Interviews LIB-33_28-11-13; LIB-3_13-11-2013; SL-24_28-1-
14; for Liberia, see also UNSC, Final Report of the Panel of Experts 
on Liberia Submitted Pursuant to Paragraph 5 (f) of Security Council 
Resolution 2079 (2012), S/2013/683 (25 November 2013), 33. 
123  Interview SL-30_30-1-14; Nina Engwicht, Illegal Markets in 
Post-conflict Societies: The Sierra Leonean Diamond Market (forth-
coming), 17. 
124  Interview SL-27_29-1-14. 
125  Interview LIB-3_13-11-2013. 
controls. As digging for mineral resources is labour-
intensive and the trade relies on established business 
relationships in the countries of origin, the networks 
which earn money from these activities are highly 
localized. Unlike the scams, the line between licit and 
illicit is not clear-cut for the trade in real gold and 
diamonds; it is therefore debatable whether some of 
these activities can be classed as organized crime.  
Other illicit economies in Liberia, Sierra Leone and 
Guinea – although certainly well-organized, with a 
transnational dimension – qualify to a lesser extent as 
external stressors with drivers outside the region. In 
addition to the transit of hard drugs, cannabis, for 
example, is grown, traded and consumed in all three 
countries. Occasionally, the trafficking extends beyond 
the three focus countries, mostly to other countries 
in the region, such as Côte d’Ivoire. However, the trade 
is particularly active between and within the three 
countries, especially between Liberia and Sierra Leone 
(in both directions).126 Security officials are apparently 
involved in the trafficking.127 In November 2013, for 
example, a Liberian police officer who had been under 
observation for some time was arrested as he attempt-
ed to smuggle cannabis with a street value of more 
than USD 36,000 across the border in an official vehicle. 
The operation led to the arrests of a superintendent, 
the head of the presidential escort, and four others, 
including a member of the Sierra Leonean armed 
forces.128 
Forms of human trafficking exist in all three coun-
tries, although it is difficult to track flows of people 
within the region as there is freedom of movement 
within the ECOWAS region and the borders are porous 
anyway. Alongside some notorious cases in which 
Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia have been transit or 
target countries for human trafficking from Asia, it 
appears, on the whole, to be a local phenomenon. 
Often, children from rural areas are sent or lured to 
the cities, where they are exploited as cheap labour. 
Some of these activities are well-planned and organ-
ized and have devastating impacts. As this paper 
focuses on transnational crime, however, they will 
not be considered further. 
Genuinely systematic forms of piracy and robbery 
at sea mainly occur in, or are orchestrated from, 
 
126  Interviews LIB-20_22-11-13; SL-4_17-1-14; SL-6_17-1-14;  
SL-13_23-1-14; LIB-10_19-11-13. 
127  Interview LIB-38_2-12-13. 
128  Interviews LIB-11_19-11-13; LIB-51_5-12-13; LIB-6_15-11-
2013. For details of another similar case, see UNSC, Midterm 
Report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia (see note 78), 21. 
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Nigerian waters. In most cases, the theft of the cargo – 
primarily oil – is the aim, but kidnapping for ransom 
also seems to have increased.129 So far, these activities 
have not developed into a regional stress factor, mean-
ing they have not shifted into the three focus coun-
tries’ coastal waters. 
Criminal networks and violent actors 
Since the political transitions, there has been little 
systematic violence in the illicit economies in the 
three focus countries. Cocaine trafficking through 
West Africa has not given rise, as yet, to a noticeable 
increase in violence,130 and the illicit trade in natural 
resources is not connected to non-state armed groups 
to any significant extent, unlike the situation at the 
time of the war economies.131 When the rise in cocaine 
trafficking through West Africa came to light, there 
was a concern within the international community 
that the region was at risk of becoming an epicentre 
for instability,132 largely because other transit areas, 
notably in Central America, have experienced high 
levels of criminal violence. In Guatemala and El Salva-
dor, for example, murder rates have even exceeded 
those that occurred during the civil wars.133 
This level of instability has not (yet) materialized in 
the three countries that are the focus of this study. 
Currently, there do not seem to be any strong links 
between organized crime and armed groups that 
control territories and challenge state authority. This 
differs significantly from the scenario in the past, at 
the time of the war economies. Such links existed in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone mostly by racketeers offering 
“protection” to various (licit and illicit) businesses. 
Guinea was not only directly affected by the civil wars 
in its immediate neighbourhood, but became itself 
part of the war economies. Unlike its two neighbours, 
however, it did not break apart into separate spheres 
 
129  Interpol, Study on Fisheries Crime (see note 106), 30. 
130  WACD, Not Just in Transit (see note 8), 23. 
131  Even in Mali, the links between traffickers and extrem-
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tunistic in nature, cf. WACD, Not Just in Transit (see note 8), 9. 
132  Statement by Antonio Maria Costa, UNODC Executive 
Director (to 2010), in UNODC, Drug Trafficking as a Security 
Threat in West Africa (Vienna, November 2008), 1. 
133  Liza Ten Velde, The Northern Triangle’s Drugs-Violence Nexus: 
The Role of the Drugs Trade in Criminal Violence and Policy Responses 
in Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, TNI Briefing Series No. 
2012/1, Drugs & Conflict Debate Papers (Amsterdam: Trans-
national Institute [TNI], November 2012), 2. 
of influence whose continued existence depended on 
access to natural resources such as diamonds, gold 
and timber.134 In Guinea, authority remained, to a 
large extent, in the hands of the state or, rather, the 
military; the latter was itself involved in the war eco-
nomies in two ways: firstly, through its support for 
armed groups, mainly the United Liberation Move-
ment of Liberia – Kromah Faction (ULIMO-K), which in 
turn engaged in trafficking with Guinean soldiers, and 
secondly as part of the ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring 
Group (ECOMOG), whose troops also joined in the 
looting in Monrovia.135 Overall, however, the profits 
generated in this way by the Guinean military cannot 
be compared with the flourishing war economy main-
tained by Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia (NPFL) in the area under their control. 
The revenue generated there mainly consisted of taxes 
or levies, on diamond and gold exports, among other 
things, amounting to an estimated USD 75 million a 
year.136 Furthermore, timber companies based in Côte 
d’Ivoire were able to export from the region, mainly to 
Europe.137 It was mainly to gain access to the diamond 
fields in Sierra Leone that led to Taylor’s support for 
the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which invaded 
the area from Liberian territory in 1991.138 Control of 
the diamond mining areas changed hands several 
times, and remained a pillar of the war economy in 
both countries until 2002, with the RUF organizing 
exports via Liberia.139 Furthermore, marijuana grown 
in northern Liberia was exported by the NPFL to 
various criminal syndicates in Côte d’Ivoire.140 Overall, 
the civil war, at least in Liberia, changed the arrange-
ments between West African entrepreneurs and West-
ern partners engaged in the timber, diamond and 
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drug trade.141 Armed groups utilized illicit activities 
as a source of income, while entrepreneurs entered 
into largely opportunistic alliances in order to exploit 
the resources and bring them to the international 
markets. The line between licit and illicit activities 
thus became increasingly blurred. The international 
community finally imposed sanctions, banning, 
among other things, the import of rough diamonds 
from Sierra Leone (Security Council Resolution 1306/ 
2000) and logs and timber products from Liberia 
(Security Council Resolution 1521/2003). These meas-
ures at least contributed to ending the civil wars in 
2002 and 2003 after numerous peace agreements 
proved fruitless.  
The remnants of the war economies did not simply 
go away, however; instead, they underwent a trans-
formation as state authority was restored. Further-
more, parts of the armed group structures from the 
civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone have remained 
intact.142 Vigilante groups operate at least to some 
extent along former chains of command.143 The UN 
Panel of Experts noted as recently as 2014 that thou-
sands of ex-combatants in Liberia are engaged in illicit 
mining under their former commanders.144 In the 
Gola Forest region on the Sierra Leonean side of the 
border, too, Liberian ex-combatants and others are 
involved in illicit gold mining and poaching. Small 
arms are in circulation here and violent attacks occur, 
especially against rangers.145 Sporadic cross-border 
attacks by militias also occur in Liberia along the 
border with Côte d’Ivoire. However, it seems more 
likely that artisanal shotguns and hard drugs such as 
cocaine are reaching Liberia via Guinea.146 In remote 
 
141  Ibid., 27. 
142  According to UNODC, weapons are also still in circula-
tion in the region – especially firearms, which come either 
from official stocks or are part of the legacy of the civil wars, 
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74), 33. Handguns manufactured in Guinea also find their 
way to neighbouring countries such as Sierra Leone and 
Liberia (Interviews SL-11_21-1-14; LIB-3_13-11-2013; LIB-20_22-
11-13). 
143  Mariam Persson, “Demobilized or Remobilized? Linger-
ing Rebel Structures in Post-war Liberia”, in African Conflicts 
and Informal Power: Big Men and Networks, ed. Mats Utas (New 
York: Zed Books, 2012), 101–18 (106ff.). 
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areas, particularly in Liberia, there is generally scope 
for organized criminal networks to make use of local 
groups with a high potential for violence. In all three 
countries, youth gangs in the capital cities, which 
are regularly mobilized by politicians for their own 
purposes, are partly involved in smaller-scale drug 
dealing.147 In Guinea’s capital Conakry in particular, 
the hierarchical and established structure of these 
groups make them a useful political tool in public 
protests, which are also accompanied by violence.148 
Occasional violent clashes have also occurred in Sierra 
Leone when marijuana plantations being guarded and 
defended by groups of young men have been raided 
by law enforcement agencies.149 In Guinea, as in the 
other two countries, violence occasionally erupts 
among artisanal diggers or between these miners and 
industrial mining companies, sometimes escalating 
into riots, mainly over land use.150 Drug-related vio-
lence tends to be triggered by or break out among 
consumers, but not between or within the various 
trafficking networks.151 Certain criminal activities 
such as robbery and human trafficking are, by their 
very nature, associated with the use or threat of 
violence, but in the three focus countries, organized 
criminal activity is not currently reflected in high 
rates of violence. This suggests that criminal networks’ 
operations can simply bypass, or are shielded by, the 
state. In the latter case, the ruling elites skim off the 
rents from criminal business activities, and the clan-
destine alliances prevent open conflicts between TOC 
and the state.152 In such circumstances, violence tends 
to be sporadic and mainly occurs at the extreme ends 
of the value chains.  
The state and its criminalization 
The integration of illicit economies into political arrange-
ments in West Africa has a long history. Official govern-
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ment positions tend to be closely intermeshed with 
private interests and are frequently used to grant allies 
impunity.153 In the three focus countries considered 
here, this was already the case before the emergence 
of war economies. Even before the 1990s, large parts of 
their economies were barely formalized and many 
activities took place in a grey area. This area extended 
even further with the criminal activities involving 
armed groups during the civil wars, since the already 
indistinct line between legality and illegality became 
even more blurred.154 This also affected Guinea, al-
though unlike Liberia and Sierra Leone, it did not 
break apart into different spheres of influence. None-
theless, its involvement in the neighbours’ wars, par-
ticularly Liberia’s, had clear implications for Guinea’s 
own political order centering around the military. 
There was growing indiscipline and insubordination 
in the army, giving officers free rein to engage in 
criminal activities. Senior military and police person-
nel were involved in international drug trafficking at 
the time.155 After the death of the President in 2008, 
these links were broken by the new leader, not least 
with the arrest of ex-President Conté’s son, who was 
implicated in drug trafficking.156 However, this did 
not end the general lawlessness. Only after the signing 
of the Ouagadougou Accord in January 2010 was a 
civilian transitional government installed. So the post-
conflict phase in Liberia and Sierra Leone and the 
settlement in Guinea envisaged a political transition 
which was intended to lead not only to multi-party 
elections but also sweeping institutional reforms, 
including in the security sector.  
This statebuilding (or restructuring) had two core 
components. Firstly, key players from the old system 
were integrated into the new one in order to guaran-
tee some measure of stability. Secondly, state author-
ity, at least in a formal sense, and a framework of 
legality were (re)established. So while the old patron-
age networks continued to be important, the political 
reforms created new opportunities to buy influence 
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2014). 
or protection. In Guinea, for example, one of the key 
sponsors of President Alpha Condé’s election cam-
paign was given the post of Fisheries Minister in the 
new government. He not only was engaged in the 
fisheries sector himself but was also accused of cor-
ruption and complicity in IUU fishing. Due to his un-
willingness to take steps against illegal fishing, in 
March 2014 the EU listed Guinea as a non-cooperating 
country, banning imports of its fishery products into 
the EU.157 Only then was the Minister removed from 
office, but he was simply given another ministerial 
post.158 
In Liberia and Sierra Leone, too, links between 
criminal organizations and public figures have fre-
quently come to light. Generally, there are three basic 
schemes of implication. In the first, officials award 
licences, concessions and the like, bypassing official 
channels or exploiting existing loopholes.159 In the 
second, criminals buy protection from prosecution by 
law enforcement agencies and/or the courts, either 
on an ad hoc basis, e.g. if arrest is imminent, or in ad-
vance by establishing arrangements with, in most 
cases, senior officials; this type of connection came to 
light when the deputy director of the Liberian Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA), Albert Chelley, was dis-
missed in August 2013 because he had conspired with 
Nigerian drug traffickers and on two occasions pre-
vented the arrest of heroin smugglers.160 In Sierra 
Leone, it has frequently been reported that paramount 
chiefs – the most important traditional authority – 
and politicians protect cannabis plantations and that 
government officials are behind “cartels”, i.e. places 
where more expensive drugs are sold and distributed, 
in the capital Freetown.161 In the third scheme, offi-
cials are actually illicit entrepreneurs themselves. For 
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example, it is frequently alleged that government 
officials in the focus countries are engaged in illicit 
gold or diamond mining operations.162 This variant 
of state involvement seems most likely to occur in 
localized criminal activities with regional links. In all 
other cases, arrangements for protection of criminal 
activities appear to predominate. 
Despite reforms of the legal and institutional 
frameworks in these three West African countries, 
many transactions still depend on personal relations. 
These relations are utilized by illicit entrepreneurs in 
a variety of ways. The irregular granting of certificates 
or licences naturally only works for legal goods. For 
example, many industrial fishing vessels operate 
under a Liberian flag of convenience; this means that 
the vessels are registered in Liberia because it is lax in 
carrying out its regulatory responsibilities. There are 
also reports that fisheries and other agencies’ inspec-
tors leak information to vessels engaged in illegal 
fishing.163 In this sector, however, the need for onshore 
protection is still very limited as none of the three 
focus counties is remotely capable of carrying out ef-
fective surveillance in its exclusive economic zone. 
It is also easier to evade controls at sea than is the case 
with, say, illegal logging onshore. Criminal activities 
in this latter sector normally require the assent of 
local dignitaries, as in Sierra Leone, where some para-
mount chiefs who are custodians of the land, are 
generally assumed to extend a protective hand to il-
legal logging operations.164 A logistics infrastructure 
is also required for timber to be exported including 
official ports. Illegal fishing, by contrast, can rely on 
transhipment at sea and largely avoid contact with 
authorities in the region.  
Illicit mining and trading of gold and diamonds, 
as already mentioned, generally rely on established 
relationships of trust, not least with public officials, 
especially at the subnational level.165 There seems to 
be a similar scenario with the protection of cannabis 
growing.166 However, security officials are also directly 
involved in regional trafficking of cannabis.167 Cocaine, 
on the other hand, is a far more expensive commodity 
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which generally has to be smuggled via ports and/or 
airports and across borders by external actors, who 
seem to rely more on higher-level protection. Although 
the flagrant entanglement of the military with drug 
kingpins is now a thing of the past in Guinea, there 
are signs of complicity at the highest political level.168 
Government officials also appear to have been impli-
cated in the case involving the Cessna seized in Free-
town in 2008. Among those arrested was the cousin 
of the Minister of Transport and Aviation, who not 
only knew about the aircraft but even granted it per-
mission to land.169 Liberia and Sierra Leone are not 
rated as major cocaine trafficking hubs but there are 
still cases of state actors’ involvement in facilitating 
or protecting drug trafficking.170 What’s more, even 
if higher-ranking criminals are apprehended, trials – 
let alone convictions – are rare, for it is very easy to be 
released after an arrest by paying a “fine” or a bribe. 
It is not surprising, then, that Liberians, for example, 
perceive the police and the courts to be the most 
corrupt institutions in their country.171 Public confi-
dence in government is correspondingly low. At the 
same time, the exposure of cases of government 
officials who are involved shows that control mecha-
nisms are also being strengthened, albeit patchily. 
TOC and livelihoods 
The weak formalized economy in the three focus 
countries has been further eroded by civil wars and 
political instability. The precarious situation of much 
of the population is reflected, inter alia, in these coun-
tries’ Human Development Index rankings (Liberia: 
175th, Guinea: 179th, Sierra Leone: 183th out of 187 
countries).172 Neither public safety nor the rule of law 
or provision of basic public services such as health and 
education is assured. In such contexts, TOC can offer 
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an important source of income, with criminal net-
works taking on the role of providers of services, in 
some cases even including security.173 In Guinea, 
Liberia and Sierra Leone, however, this only seems to 
apply to a very limited extent. The economic sectors 
that are firmly embedded in illicit global trade flows 
mainly have harmful effects; this applies especially 
to illegal fishing. Overfishing and the destruction of 
marine habitats are putting local fishermen’s liveli-
hoods, as well as food security, at risk in all three 
countries. In Guinea, for example, as much as 60 per 
cent of the population in coastal areas depends on 
fishing, so lower catches have devastating impacts.174 
Some artisanal fishermen now supply the large indus-
trial vessels as this is the only way to make anything 
approaching an adequate living. However, these 
arrangements are often highly disadvantageous to 
fishermen, just as the working conditions on board 
the fishing vessels themselves are often inhumane. 
This may explain why fishermen’s associations are 
now involved in monitoring coastal waters, quite 
successfully, for example, with the support of an inter-
national NGO in Sierra Leone.175 Despite some minor 
employment effects of illegal logging, the subsequent 
environmental degradation destroys livelihoods. This 
applies particularly in cases where private use permits 
for local landowners are used as a legal loophole for 
the benefit of large companies, as in Liberia.176 
The drug trade is seen as an attractive income-
generating opportunity, mainly for young people 
facing unemployment and a lack of prospects.177 This, 
however, only applies to a very limited extent to the 
local trade in hard drugs, such as cocaine, in the three 
focus countries as the market is small and largely con-
fined to a few cities and the mining areas. It therefore 
offers limited income-generating opportunities for 
young people, as was the case in Conakry in the 2000s, 
when the state began to be deeply implicated in drug 
trafficking and many youths were recruited for rela-
tively well-paid illicit activities.178 Furthermore, drug 
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smuggling – unlike the cultivation of illicit crops – 
is not a labour-intensive activity179 and therefore 
employs relatively few people. Cannabis growing in 
Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone not only yields 
higher returns compared with conventional crops 
such as rice, but is also likely to be more lucrative 
for local communities than cocaine smuggling.180 
In many communities, however, potential income 
effects conflict with concerns about rising drug con-
sumption, which is generally associated with violence, 
petty crime, prostitution and social problems.181 In 
this instance, “drugs” mainly means alcohol and can-
nabis, although hard drugs – usually “cut”, i.e. adulter-
ated – are also used. Although more precise figures 
are not available for any of the three countries, there 
are clear indications that in all of them, cocaine and 
heroin are used beyond the small wealthy elite in 
small quantities, for example as “magic sticks” or 
crack. In the cities, there are well-known places where 
drugs are sold and consumed, such as the “ghettos” 
in Liberia. There is also reported to be a high level of 
drug use among workers (“boys”) in mining areas.182 
From a livelihood perspective, the drug trade has 
mainly harmful impacts, although the income from 
cannabis growing and trading is by no means insig-
nificant for poorer social groups. The West Africa 
Commission on Drugs (WACD), for example, regards 
the eradication of cultivation areas as problematical 
as the drug has been grown and consumed in the 
region for decades and few alternatives exist for small 
farmers.183 
Illicit mining of gold and diamonds also provides 
large numbers of young men with employment, albeit 
associated with a high level of insecurity, hard physi-
cal labour and environmental degradation. Usually, 
the diggers work in groups under a “miner” who 
supports them with equipment, food and in some 
cases money. Indeed, due to the lack of alternatives, 
the argument for tolerating such illicit activities is 
often made, not least in Liberia, where many former 
combatants who fought in the civil war have found 
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work in this sector.184 For that reason, the local 
authorities and public administration in Sierra Leone 
also do not attempt to systematically stamp out illicit 
mining. However, workers are also systematically 
exploited and often duped over the true value of the 
diamonds or gold that they find.185 Unlike artisanal 
mining, local communities often view industrial 
mining with extreme mistrust, especially if mining 
companies’ arrangements with central government 
have come about in an intransparent manner. In all 
three countries, violent protests against mining com-
panies have frequently occurred, generally accompa-
nied by complaints that local communities are not 
profiting from the extractive activities to an adequate 
extent.186 This shows how activities that are legal in a 
formal sense may come to be regarded as illegimate if 
the state’s action lacks transparency for broad sections 
of the population.  
Overall, little is known about how local communi-
ties, especially in more remote areas, view illicit eco-
nomies. A community consultation in border regions 
of Sierra Leone showed that people there view illicit 
activities such as arms and human trafficking in com-
bination with prostitution and the cannabis trade as 
a threat.187 Globally relevant areas of TOC, such as 
cocaine trafficking and illegal fishing, are by their very 
nature a more significant issue in the capital cities or 
along the coasts, whereas illegal logging, gold and 
diamond mining and cannabis cultivation are of more 
concern in the hinterland. It is difficult to determine 
how the profits from TOC or protection rackets are 
used or laundered. In Liberia, for example, it is gener-
ally assumed that the key actors in the war economy 
invested their income in hotels, real estate, radio 
stations and other similar types of enterprise. The UN 
Panel of Experts on Liberia has looked very closely at 
a number of individuals, including the Commissioner 
of Maritime Affairs under Charles Taylor.188 However, 
the exact sources of the money he invested remain 
unclear just as it is unknown whether any quasi-public 
services were being provided.  
 
184  UNSC, Midterm Report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia (May 
2014) (see note 78), 19; UNSC, Final Report of the Panel of Experts 
on Liberia, November 2013 (see note 122), 19. 
185  Engwicht, Illegal Markets in Post-conflict Societies (see note 
123), 9f. 
186  Interviews SL-47_8-2-14; LIB-37_2-12-13; GUI-4_22-7-14. 
187  Interview SL-47_8-2-14. 
188  See, inter alia, UNSC, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on 
Liberia (see note 122), 24f. 
What is clear is that TOC that is strongly driven by 
demand in other world regions and by external net-
works has negative effects on local communities’ live-
lihoods overall. By contrast, localized, labour-intensive 
illicit activities can, at least some of the time, be 
viewed as an important source of income, although 
their negative effects on local communities’ living 
conditions must also be considered. 
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New wine in old bottles again? 
Options for development cooperation 
 
The analysis of illicit economies in Guinea, Liberia 
and Sierra Leone, based on the four threat categories, 
reveals a complex picture. Broadly speaking, the find-
ings are not transferable to other fragile states, for 
there are not only varying degrees but also various 
types of fragility in which one and the same form of 
TOC can manifest in different ways and pose other 
challenges. Histories and regional characteristics 
naturally vary as well. Nonetheless, it is possible to 
identify the potential threats and possible responses 
for other contexts with reference to the four modi 
operandi of TOC. 
Identifying threats and trade-offs 
Cocaine trafficking and illegal fishing are powerful 
external stressors in the three focus counties. Al-
though they have, so far, rarely been associated with 
violence, they clearly have negative repercussions on 
society. However, drug transit is now becoming more 
firmly established in the region, mainly through pro-
tection arrangements with higher-ranking officials, 
particularly in Guinea. Deterrence measures are most-
ly supported or monitored by external actors. There 
are few entry points for meaningful capacity building, 
especially in Guinea, where not a single key drug traf-
ficker has ever served a term of imprisonment. Even 
the revelations in 2008 about the involvement of in-
fluential individuals, including Ousmane Conté, the 
son of the former President, had few repercussions. 
Indeed, many of the officials suspected ended up in 
new government positions after the 2010 elections.189 
Due to the political situation in Guinea, it is currently 
hard to imagine the establishment of effective control 
mechanisms in the country. A strengthening of trans-
parency is therefore most likely to be achieved through 
the introduction of general rules for the political pro-
cess, e.g. on political party funding, through checks 
and balances in government institutions, and via the 
 
189  Gberie, Crime, Violence, and Politics (see note 76), 11 and 13. 
media and civil society initiatives which, however, 
might be confronted with threats and assaults. 
In Liberia and Sierra Leone, by contrast, there are 
better conditions for building law enforcement capac-
ities. Nonetheless, it is essential to consider the poten-
tial for violence here, especially involving urban gangs 
– which are already being manipulated for political 
purposes – and militias that are partly the legacy of 
civil war. None of these is currently classed as a threat 
to the two countries’ stability, but any geographical 
expansion of more effective law enforcement could 
well trigger a reaction – especially if it targets canna-
bis cultivation and small drug users or dealers to a 
greater extent. More targeted capacity building meas-
ures therefore focus on serious and transnational 
crime. In particular, the West Africa Coast Initiative 
(WACI) launched in 2009 by the United Nations Office 
for West Africa (UNOWA) in collaboration with UNODC, 
the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
and Interpol has established Transnational Crime 
Units in various countries in the region. Such units 
have also been set up in Liberia and Sierra Leone in 
recent years and are now conducting operations 
against transnational crime. To ensure that any action 
taken against higher-ranking cocaine traffickers is 
successful in the medium term, it is necessary not only 
to maintain the level of international engagement over 
the longer term, but also to press ahead with judicial 
reform. Otherwise, there is a risk that kingpins – even 
if they are arrested – will not be sentenced appropri-
ately or will walk free.  
Compared with the drug trade, there is less poten-
tial for violence in illegal fishing. The protection eco-
nomy for this type of business also appears to be less 
developed. If more robust law enforcement action is 
taken, however, there is a risk that fishing companies 
engaged in illegal activities will increasingly buy po-
litical protection. Quasi-legal front companies already 
exist, especially in Guinea, along with official complic-
ity. A number of discretely negotiated agreements 
existed in the past as well. For example, an agreement 
was signed in December 2009 for a two-year period 
between the Guinean Ministry for Fisheries and Aqua-
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culture and the relevant Chinese Ministry, guarantee-
ing exemptions from the legislation in force for 
China’s largest fishing company.190 Alongside the 
dislocation of illegal fishing operations, such arrange-
ments are more likely than a violent reaction to in-
tensified surveillance. Although violence at sea does 
occur in the West African region, mainly in the con-
text of piracy and robbery, these forms of criminal 
activity are still fairly uncommon in the coastal waters 
of the three focus countries. Efforts should therefore 
be focused on protecting the fisheries sector from 
greater linkage between criminal actors and govern-
ment institutions with at least the same level of 
engagement as in building deterrence capacity. As 
this latter area entails considerable costs and efforts 
for training and equipment, it may be appropriate 
to involve local fishermen in the monitoring of some 
stretches of coastline to a greater extent. This strategy 
can only succeed, in turn, with well-functioning and 
independent institutions capable of taking effective 
action in response to surveillance reports. 
Unlike illegal fishing and cocaine trafficking, illicit 
activities in the logging industry and the gold/diamond 
trade have a stronger territorial base and are linked 
more closely to actors within the three countries. 
These criminal activities were an important element 
of the war economies in the 1990s, so the initial 
priority was to break the links between business and 
violence. This was broadly successful, but with more 
or less effective regulation and surveillance regimes 
evolving as part of the statebuilding process after 
the civil wars and, in the case of Guinea, during the 
transition. Curbing illegal practices in the forestry 
sector still poses particular problems, firstly due to 
strong demand and weak controls in Asia, and second-
ly due to the entanglement of subnational authorities 
in particular in this line of business in the three coun-
tries. Furthermore, effective surveillance is even more 
difficult to implement in this sector than in fishing, 
not least because forest guards in remote areas are 
exposed to pressure from powerful local elites and 
even armed attacks, as is evident from incidents in the 
Gola Forest on the border between Liberia and Sierra 
Leone. Admittedly, these acts of violence have little 
to do with organized illegal logging, but forest con-
servation sometimes disrupts other activities such as 
poaching, illicit mining and cannabis growing.  
A more important step in combating transnational 
logging operations is surely to tighten the controls at 
 
190  Greenpeace, Africa’s Fisheries’ Paradise (see note 101), 37. 
ports and at border transit points used by trucks. This 
more intensive surveillance would have an important 
deterrent effect, especially during periods when export 
bans are in place. However, sustainable governance 
of the timber sector requires not only transparent pro-
cedures for the granting of concessions but also, and 
above all, more intensive cooperation with local com-
munities and subnational authorities, for without a 
nationwide system of surveillance – which is not with-
in reach – it is these communities and authorities 
which can help to curb large-scale illegal logging. 
However, such intensified cooperation can only be 
achieved with appropriate incentives and better 
regulation of land use.  
The networks which control gold and diamond 
mining and trading have been well-established for 
many years and operate on a transnational basis. 
Many brokers or dealers come from other countries 
within the region or are of Lebanese origin and have 
been in the business for generations. As many of the 
deals using these trade networks are informal, the 
line between legal and illegal economic activities in 
this sector is especially blurred. Achieving effective 
controls of the transnational illicit trade is hardly a 
realistic option, for smaller stones and gold can be 
smuggled with ease. Further harmonization of legis-
lation and certification schemes between the three 
countries would be helpful, however, and a move in 
this direction is already under way with the Regional 
Approach in the Mano River Union. In Sierra Leone, 
for example, the Finance Act 2015 – the new legis-
lation on royalties and taxes on minerals – imposes a 
3 per cent export duty on Special Stones, as in neigh-
bouring countries.191 This adjustment reduces the 
incentives for smuggling to Liberia and Guinea. Other 
ways of improving the sharing of information and 
the cooperation on reinforcing the certification sys-
tem and strengthening controls between the four 
countries are the subject of ongoing discussion within 
the Regional Approach framework.192 Repressive meas-
 
191  Kimberley Process, Sierra Leone Annual Report 2014 to the 
Working Group of Monitors (WGM) of the Kimberley Process Certifica-
tion Scheme (KPCS), 7, www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/system/ 
files/documents/2014_kpcs_annual_report_sierra_leone.pdf 
(accessed 1 October 2015). 
192  See, inter alia, this report on the Regional Approach to 
the KP Implementation Meeting: John Momo, “Abidjan Hosts 
Regional Approach to Kimberly Process (KP) Implementation 
Meeting”, Goxi (online), 19 March 2015, http://goxi.org/ 
profiles/blogs/abidjan-hosts-regional-approach-to-kimberly-
process-kp (accessed 2 October 2015). 
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ures to stamp out illicit artisanal mining and illicit/ 
informal trade structures would be counterproduc-
tive, however, as both forms of employment – par-
ticularly artisanal mining – play an important liveli-
hood role for large numbers of people. As trust and 
personal contacts are extremely important in this line 
of business, it is unlikely that powerful external net-
works will be able to move into these illicit activities 
very easily, unless by force. Firmer action should be 
taken against the well-organized scams in the gold 
and diamond trade, which means improving the rele-
vant authorities’ capacities first. Another problem is 
the potential for violence in the mining areas – where 
high levels of drug use and prostitution are already 
causing social tensions. As the most accessible mineral 
deposits are dwindling, measures to prevent violence 
and encourage alternative forms of development 
would be useful here.  
In view of these risks associated with TOC in fragile 
states, the development community should focus more 
intensively on the various forms and impacts of orga-
nized crime. At the same time, development actors 
face narrow constraints, as they must consider the 
safety and security of their staff, the available re-
sources, and relations with the partner country con-
cerned. Simply for practical reasons, it is impossible to 
deal with all the aspects outlined above. Nonetheless, 
by weighing up the various trade-offs and side effects 
in addressing the threat categories, it is possible to 
determine where and how development cooperation 
can make a contribution. The first step, however, is to 
assess the impacts of one’s own actions. 
From “do no harm” to “do no crime”? 
Development programmes should be not only conflict- 
but also crime-sensitive. However, simply transferring 
or modifying the “do no harm” principle into “do 
no crime”193 is problematical. Indeed, the consistent 
implementation of “do no harm” can itself create 
difficulties. But conducting a micro conflict analysis 
and planning appropriate programmes which do not 
fuel conflicts but, ideally, strengthen the potential for 
peace is feasible in principle. Due to the cross-cutting 
nature of TOC, its presence in almost every area of 
 
193  James Cockayne, “Breaking the Crime Trap: Factoring 
Crime into Development Policy”, Global Observatory (online), 
13 February 2014, http://theglobalobservatory.org/2014/02/ 
breaking-the-crime-trap-factoring-crime-into-development-
policy/ (accessed 16 March 2015). 
(economic) life and its intermeshing with power struc-
tures, this approach is only transferable to a limited 
extent. One option is to focus on criminal violence, 
and in fact, some donor countries have already ex-
panded their conflict analyses to include crime ana-
lyses as well.194 However, in order to better understand 
when to engage on organized crime-related issues and 
when not, the development community must invest 
more heavily in analytical tools that can capture TOC 
as part of the political economy.195 To that end, exist-
ing instruments must be enhanced, or new ones 
developed.196 
The first objective should be to analyze the status 
quo with regard to TOC as fully as possible, although 
information on this issue is, by its very nature, diffi-
cult to access. This assessment should form the basis 
for the second step, namely setting priorities. Due to 
the trade-offs identified and possible unintended side 
effects of any measures adopted, the focus should not 
be limited from the start to specific threats such as 
violence. In reality, given the many different types and 
impacts of TOC, development cooperation will be 
unable to avoid its programmes having any impact in 
this area. Nonetheless, it is important to carefully 
weigh up decisions on how to proceed. Furthermore, 
such an analysis is useful in exploring entry points 
for TOC-related cooperation with other policy fields 
and in making use of synergies within one’s own 
measures. The fact is that trade-offs exist not only 
between security and development, but also between 
the various approaches pursued in the context of 
development cooperation. 
A whole-of-government approach 
Development policy generally recognizes that global 
factors, such as TOC, which worsen state fragility, 
can only be addressed as an inter-agency responsibility 
and on the basis of multilateral cooperation.197 In 
Germany, for example, the Interministerial Guidelines 
for Coherent Federal Government Policy towards 
Fragile States make explicit reference to the global 
structures and factors which can trigger and perpetu-
ate localized fragility, including arms, drug and 
 
194  USAID, for example, conducted this type of analysis in 
Niger in December 2013. 
195  Getting Smart, ed. Kavanagh (see note 16), 30. 
196  The existing brief political economy analyses (PÖK) are a 
possible starting point for German development cooperation. 
197  BMZ, Entwicklung für Frieden und Sicherheit (see note 19), 13. 
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human trafficking and the natural resource trade.198 
At the same time, it is noticeable that not only for-
eign, security and development policy actors but also 
law enforcement entities around the world are show-
ing greater interest in closer involvement in whole-of-
government approaches.199 Such an approach makes 
most sense in relation to forms of TOC which are both 
particularly lucrative and well-organized but also 
highly damaging to the affected countries and their 
populations. In fragile states, this is likely to be those 
forms of TOC which are driven by strong demand in 
other world regions and by externally dominated 
networks. Here, an approach which does not involve 
strengthening deterrence is going to face difficulties. 
But even then, linking development approaches with 
building law enforcement capacities is far from auto-
matic. Rather, the pros and cons of such measures 
should be carefully weighed up in light of the poten-
tial for violence linked to TOC, the state’s involvement 
in TOC, and TOC’s importance for the livelihoods of 
certain demographic groups. 
As illegal fishing off the coast of the three focus 
countries is rarely linked to violence and the state’s 
involvement is sporadic, but at the same time there 
are clearly negative effects for local communities’ 
livelihoods, this sector appears to be suitable for a 
whole-of-government approach. Due to the specific 
nature of TOC as an external stressor, one option may 
be not only to link individual bilateral programmes 
but to focus on the illicit value chain as a whole. 
Indeed, this is already happening with the German 
fund for cross-cutting political cooperation, which 
implements the programme on Combating Poaching 
and Illegal Wildlife Trade (Ivory and Rhino Horn) in 
Africa and Asia. The initiative is coordinated by GIZ 
and involves not only five German ministries (BMZ, 
BMUB, AA, BMF and BMI) and the partner countries’ 
governments but also NGOs, the private sector and 
international institutions such as the World Customs 
 
198  Deutscher Bundestag, 17. Wahlperiode, Ressortübergreifen-
de Leitlinien für eine kohärente Politik der Bundesregierung gegenüber 
fragilen Staaten, Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung, Druck-
sache 17/10732 (19 September 2012), 1. 
199  Finn Stepputat and Lauren Greenwood, Whole-of-Govern-
ment Approaches to Fragile States and Situations, DIIS Report 25/ 
2013 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies 
[DIIS], 2013), 24. 
Organization.200 A similar format, which combines 
law enforcement, management of protected areas and 
alternative development for local communities with 
anti-corruption measures, transregional dialogue 
forums and demand-oriented awareness-raising cam-
paigns, may be feasible as a response to illegal fishing 
off the West African coast. However, implementing 
this type of approach at sea faces considerable ob-
stacles, not least because of the massive technical 
efforts required and the difficult conditions in the 
maritime sector. What is clear, however, is that more 
stringent surveillance of the three countries’ coastal 
waters is unlikely to be sustainable without more 
effective and transparent governance and onshore 
management of the fisheries sector. Development co-
operation can make an important contribution, not 
only in this field but also in involving artisanal fisher-
men, who are particularly impacted by the organized 
forms of illegal fishing. What’s more, if artisanal 
fishermen are to be engaged in monitoring, appro-
priate information and organizational arrangements 
are essential, along with trustful relationships with 
the relevant authorities.  
With regard to cocaine trafficking in the region, 
the preconditions for this type of whole-of-government 
approach do not exist. Due to the sometimes strong 
links between criminal networks and officials, effec-
tive deterrence in this sector is highly dependent on 
an international presence. Capacity building specifi-
cally aimed at combating cocaine trafficking in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone only makes sense in the medium 
term if it is combined with progress on security sector 
and judicial reform. In Guinea – given the present 
political conditions – it is debatable whether this form 
of capacity-building is appropriate at all; here, the 
priority should be to strengthen transparency in the 
political process as a whole. Development cooperation 
can certainly make a contribution here, as with secu-
rity sector and judicial reform. Implementing specific 
recommendations made by the West Africa Commis-
sion on Drugs (WACD) is another useful starting point, 
especially with regard to prevention and harm reduc-
tion in relation to drug use. In none of the three focus 
countries are there any significant programmes, e.g. 
for young drug addicts in the health sector, nor are 
 
200  BMZ and GIZ, Combating Poaching and the Illegal Wildlife 
Trade (Ivory, Rhino Horn) in Africa and Asia. Measure within the Fund 
for Cross-cutting Political Cooperation (Polifund), OECD DAC Anti-
Corruption Task Team Meeting, Paris, 3 November 2014. The 
Polifund format will also be used to address illicit financial 
flows. 
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there any social programmes supporting communities 
that are struggling with the effects of drug abuse. One 
option may be to launch violence prevention projects 
with a focus on urban youth gangs and the local drug 
trade in order to mitigate the worst impacts. Both 
of these approaches can be implemented without a 
whole-of-government approach. The same applies to 
measures in the forestry sector and to alternative 
development and conflict prevention programmes in 
artisanal mining areas.  
Evaluation, linking compartments and the 
multilateral level 
As shown at the start of this study, development co-
operation has a variety of entry points and instru-
ments for engaging with TOC. A first step in making 
better use of these tools is to systematically evaluate 
experience gained in fields such as conflict preven-
tion, security sector reform, the rule of law and alter-
native development, with a focus on their TOC rele-
vance. At present, development actors working in the 
affected countries have few reference points to guide 
them if they encounter TOC in their field of work. 
Consequently, these challenges are circumvented or 
ignored, not least due to concerns about possible nega-
tive effects on the ongoing projects. A crime-sensitive 
approach and the systematic identification of options 
for responding to organized crime challenges would 
provide a remedy here, at least initially. In projects 
with TOC relevance, it would also be useful to review 
the effects on the various threat categories across the 
lifetime of the projects and to adapt the measures 
accordingly if necessary. It is also of fundamental 
importance to tie development activities to debates 
and positions in the fragile states themselves and to 
international processes such as the New Deal for 
Engagement in Fragile States, for views on TOC and 
its impacts vary considerably from country to country, 
a factor which must be considered when involving 
local civil society actors in awareness-raising, for 
example.  
In tackling organized crime in the (illicit) natural 
resource trade, the regional and global levels are of 
prime importance. Linking projects with TOC rele-
vance in (sub)regions is useful if the projects are ex-
pected to have transnational impacts. This is likely, for 
example, with a comprehensive approach to illegal 
fishing and also with governance programmes and 
activities in border regions. Some formats, such as 
harmonization of legislation, are per se regional in 
focus. In view of the diverse political conditions in the 
individual countries, promoting regional cooperation, 
especially via regional or subregional organizations – 
in this instance the Mano River Union201 can play an 
important role.  
The multilateral level of regulation is not the do-
main of development cooperation. However, develop-
ment policy has substantial influence, for example in 
the implementation of the SDGs (Agenda 2030). The 
issue of TOC is dealt with in one of the targets, and it 
is essential to ensure that this and other targets with 
TOC relevance genuinely have an impact. Following 
the adoption of the SDGs at the United Nations Sus-
tainable Development Summit in September 2015, 
the priority now is to find meaningful and realistic 
global and national indicators to monitor progress 
towards the targets for SDG 16.202 But TOC, as a cross-
cutting issue, is relevant to many other SDGs as well. 
Naturally, this will not be fully reflected in the global 
indicators, but it should be considered in the further 
process, as well as in other forums, such as the OECD 
DAC and in initiatives which aim to combat illicit 
financial flows, for example.203 For although fragile 
states may be particularly at risk, TOC is often driven 
and orchestrated from other world regions and TOC 
operations are, increasingly, global in scope. 
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